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Abstract 
 
Anticipatory Strategies for Eastern European Natural Gas Security 
 
Ryan Timothy Brown, M.A.; M.G.P.S. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Charles E Gholz 
 
Countries asymmetrically dependent on the import of energy resources are 
potentially vulnerable to coercion from supplier states.  Anticipating the potential for 
coercion, asymmetrically dependent states will make infrastructure improvements to 
substitute supply if the cost of these improvements is lower than the potential cost of 
coercion. This thesis provides a pricing framework for members of the European Union 
to estimate substitution strategies in order to reduce dependence on and the potential for 
coercion by Russia.  Currently, Russia provides roughly 30% of  the EU’s natural gas 
consumption and half of this gas is transported by pipeline through Ukraine. In 2006 and 
2009, supply disruptions occurred due to a breakdown in negotiations between Russia 
and Ukraine, and some EU members responded by constructing the necessary 
infrastructure to substitute Russian gas transited through Ukraine. The infrastructure 
improvements employed by the EU and its member states are examined to provide a 
pricing framework for countries still asymmetrically dependent. These strategies include 
LNG import facilities, new pipeline construction, reversing the flow of existing pipelines, 
and adding natural gas storage. This thesis applies the pricing framework to Finland and 
 v 
 
Bulgaria to evaluate which strategies would be most effective in terms of cost and the 
provision of natural gas security. Further interconnection to the EU internal market is 
lowest in cost, but requires the cooperation of transit states in order to be effective. LNG 
import is reasonable in terms of capital expenditure and provides a viable short-term 
response to disruption, but the additional operating cost of LNG versus pipeline supply 
makes long term substitution via LNG too costly.  Overall, countries can apply the 
pricing framework  to evaluate their natural gas security and to reduce coercive 
vulnerability. 
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Chapter 1: Background/Introduction   
The natural gas security of the European Union (EU) has depended for many 
years on the result of annual negotiations between Russia and Ukraine regarding price 
and yearly allocated volume. These negotiations affect the EU because roughly 30% of 
its natural gas imports originate in Russia, half of which transit through Ukraine. In 2006 
and 2009, negotiations between the two countries fell apart and Russia announced that 
although it would not export natural gas to Ukraine, it still planned to fulfill its 
obligations to its EU customers by pipeline transit via Ukraine. Ukraine, however, took 
advantage of the situation and siphoned gas supplies to fulfill its own consumption 
requirements, leaving customers farther downstream without their contracted volumes. In 
both 2006 and 2009, natural gas supplies were eventually restored within days, but the 
EU now questions the reliability of Russia as a supplier of natural gas and Ukraine as a 
transit state. 
In 2012, the completion of the Nord Stream offshore pipeline gave western EU 
states an increased level of natural gas security by connecting Russian supply to German 
demand via the Baltic Sea. The maximum capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline is 55 
bcm/yr, amounting to 33% of Russia’s total 2017 natural gas exports to the EU (165 
bcm).1 This pipeline gave Germany, and those countries connected to Germany’s natural 
gas transmission grid, additional supply security in that this gas did not have to be 
transported via Ukraine. 
The countries of eastern Europe which are highly dependent on Russia for natural 
gas, were not given additional security of supply by the Nord Stream pipeline. When a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Delivery Statistics–Gas Supplies to Europe,” Gazprom Export, 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ 
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country is dependent on a single supplier of natural gas there is the potential for the 
supplying state to coerce its import partner. For example, natural gas is largely used for 
industrial and heating purposes in eastern Europe. In the high demand winter season, the 
supplier state, Russia, can threaten to reduce or cut off supply in order to extort political 
concessions. Both of these represent substantial costs to states dependent on Russian 
supply, giving Russia the ability to coerce. As a result, in the wake of the 2006 and 2009 
crises, these countries employed strategies such as building interstate pipeline connection, 
reversing flow of existing pipelines, increasing natural gas storage, and constructing LNG 
import capacity in order to increase security of supply. 
This thesis specifically looks at strategies employed by Eastern European 
countries post 2009 to reduce coercive vulnerability and enhance energy security by 
substituting alternative natural gas supply sources for Russian gas.  The strategies differ 
depending on countries’ geographic location, the amount of gas imported, domestic 
natural gas production, access to alternative natural gas supply and alternative sources of 
energy, and historic political relations with Russia, among other factors. The willingness 
of countries affected by the Ukraine-Russia supply disruptions to pay for infrastructure to 
reduce vulnerability to future disruptions indicates state preferences and the threat, actual 
or perceived, to the state by potential supply disruptions. 
Chapter 2 discusses relevant theories concerning asymmetric dependence, 
resource coercion, coercive vulnerability, and anticipatory strategies in order to provide a 
theoretical foundation on which to build. Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence from 
eastern Europe to discuss the individual attributes of countries which  may exhibit 
vulnerability and the actions by countries to reduce this vulnerability. Chapter 4 defines 
pricing assumptions using recent infrastructure projects to create a framework for 
countries to use when assessing supply substitution strategies. Chapters 5 and 6 apply the 
 3 
 
pricing framework to two case study countries, Finland and Bulgaria, and compare 
strategies for each country to reduce coercive vulnerability. Chapter 7 compares the case 
study results and discusses further recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Natural Gas Coercion Theory: Asymmetric Dependence, 
Coercive Vulnerability, Strategic Adaptation 
This chapter discusses the nature of trade and dependence, the ideal conditions for 
trade to be used to coerce, and strategies for states to reduce coercive vulnerability. The 
disparity in state power between trading countries and the geographic conditions which 
allow accessibility to resources determine the level of coercive vulnerability.2 When 
faced with this vulnerability, the asymmetrically dependent state will employ strategies to 
lower the vulnerability to coercion, if the value of the concession is more than the cost to 
end vulnerability. The cost to provide a substitute source of import supply varies 
depending on the unique features of the dependent state. This thesis intends to provide a 
strategic framework for Eastern European countries, that are asymmetrically dependent 
on Russian natural gas and thus vulnerable to coercion, to replace Russian natural gas 
with substitute imports. These strategies are dependent on the availability of slack supply 
from other sources, and in the case of LNG, the functioning of a global LNG market.  
2.1 MUTUAL DEPENDENCE/ASYMMETRIC DEPENDENCE  
If two countries participate in trade, both sides accrue costs and benefits from the 
transaction. Trade implies a loss of self-reliance and a level of dependence on the trade 
partner. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye define dependence as “a state of being 
determined or significantly affected by external forces.”3 In the case of Russia, the natural 
gas it exports is traded for foreign currency that flows to state-owned Gazprom, and is 
then used to fund state actions. Without those funds, the actions of the Russian state 
would be constrained. The countries which import natural gas pay cash for the good, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rosemary A. Kelanic, “The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power Behavior,” 
Security Studies 25 (2016):181-213, DOI: 10.1080/0936412.1171966. 
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, 1989), 8. 
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now are dependent on Russia to provide that good as constrained by the existing 
infrastructure. This can be characterized as mutual dependence, where each state bears 
some cost, or restriction of autonomy, by entering into a trade relationship.4 
The mutual dependence created by trade limits coercion when the cost involved 
with employing such a tactic would de prohibitively high as compared to the potential 
gains of a coercive strategy. For example, the threat posed by Russian natural gas imports 
to Europe has been discussed in numerous media sources and is often framed as a 
strategic weakness for the European Union (EU) as a single entity. 5  Some have 
speculated that Russia possesses a “gas weapon,” that can be deployed against Europe, 
where Russia would “shut off the pipes” in winter, causing widespread discomfort, slow 
economic growth, and sow political instability. The use of a “gas weapon” by Russia 
against the EU, as a single entity, would make little sense in this context due to the 
mutually dependent relationship created by this trade. Trade with the EU constitutes 60% 
of Gazprom’s revenues and 5% of Russia’s government budget revenues.6 As previously 
noted, roughly 30% of the EU’s natural gas comes from Russia. In this scenario, the cost 
for either side to attempt coercion is so high that neither side would do so unless there 
was an expected value of coercion large enough that it would outweigh the cost of 
adjustment due to the coercion attempt. In the short run it is not realistic for either side to 
break this trade relationship, and many argue that it is best for both sides to maintain the 
status quo.7 In the long run, though still unlikely, Russia could divert exports to different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 
5 Daniel McLaughlin, “New cold war in Europe as Russia turns off gas supplies,” The Independent, 
January 7, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/new-cold-war-in-europe-as-russia-
turns-off-gas-supplies-1230036.html. 
6 James Henderson, “Does Russia Have a Potent Gas Weapon?,” In: Van de Graaf, et al The Palgrave 
Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55631-8_19. 
7 Katja Yafimava, “European Energy Security and the Role of Russian Gas: Assessing the Feasibility and 
the Rationale of Reducing Dependence,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper 15-54, December 
2015. 
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markets, such as China, and Germany could switch to other another import partner or 
switch fuel type, but the adjustment costs for either country would be substantial. 
The argument for an interdependent or mutually dependent relationship between 
Russia and the EU as a whole, or with Russia’s largest European customers is reasonably 
strong. Neither side would opt to incur the costs associated with breaking the trade 
relationship by the use of economic coercion. But, the relationship between Russia and its 
smaller customers is one of asymmetric dependence, where the less dependent state, 
Russia, is able to use its trade in natural gas as a coercive tool. The potential for energy 
coercion with Gazprom’s smaller European customers is discussed below.  
2.2 TARGETING THE GAS WEAPON 
If Russia were to attempt to coerce a trade partner by manipulating its export of 
natural gas, or use the “gas weapon,” it would ideally be employed against its smaller (in 
terms of natural gas demand and state power) neighbors rather than its large trade 
partners or the EU as a single entity. A “resource weapon” is best deployed when the 
state that wields the weapon is larger than the target state, has an asymmetric trade 
balance, and when the product traded is difficult to substitute and has inelastic demand.8  
Further, the dependence of a consumer on its supplier can be assessed based upon the 
percentage of imports of total consumption, the percentage of gas in a state’s energy mix, 
the amount of slack capacity and existence of additional suppliers, and the ability for a 
country to fuel switch in a crisis.9  
Russia has shown a tendency to use energy coercion against its smaller trade 
partners, because a loss in revenues from these smaller partners does not substantially 
harm Russia financially, and the political gains may outweigh these financial losses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Randall Newnham, “Oil, carrots, and sticks: Russia’s energy resources as a foreign policy tool,”  Journal 
of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011); 134-143, doi:10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004. 
9 Brenda Shaffer, “Natural gas supply stability and foreign policy,” Energy Policy 56 (2013): 114-125. 
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Recent provocative events in natural gas trade, involving Russia and its smaller 
neighbors, highlight the potential for Russia to employ energy coercion against EU states, 
and are discussed below. 
2.2.1 Russia-Georgia 
Russia used its export of natural gas to Georgia as a tool to punish Georgia for 
what Russia viewed as threats to its power in the region. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, 
which installed a pro-Western Georgian government, Russia responded by quadrupling 
gas price within four years. Russia has also subsidized natural gas imports to the disputed 
region of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.10 In addition, Russian natural gas supplies to 
Georgia were cut, due to coordinated bombings, and electrical lines between the countries 
were sabotaged in January 2006, as Georgia applied for membership to NATO and 
initiated weapons imports from the Czech Republic.11  
If it is assumed that Russia was attempting to punish Georgia, or if these were 
simply malfunctions, Georgia no longer viewed Russia as a reliable gas supply source, 
and turned to Azerbaijan and Iran as natural gas trade partners. In 2014, Georgia 
imported 2.2 bcm of its 2.2 bcm consumption from Azerbaijan, while leaving 11 bcm of 
import capacity from Russia and Iran unused.12 Georgia, having been a target of coercion 
and anticipating the possibility of future coercion, opted to diversify its natural gas supply 
base in order to reduce vulnerability to coercion. 
2.2.2 Russia-Turkmenistan 
In 2009, a similar mysterious explosion in the pipeline that allowed Turkmenistan 
to supply Europe via Russia resulted in Turkmenistan moving away from using Russia as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Newnham, “Oil, carrots, and sticks.” 
11 Henderson, “Russia Potent Gas Weapon?”  
12 Georg Zachmann, “Energy Security of Georgia,” German Economic Team Georgia, Berlin/Tbsili, 
October 2014. 
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a transit state. Again it is unclear whether the explosion was deliberate or a malfunction 
(both Russia and Turkmenistan blame each other), but the result was diversification of 
Turkmenistan’s customer base for natural gas. Previous to the incident, Turkmenistan’s 
only pipeline export option was Russia due to the existing infrastructure. Russia would 
purchase gas at a low price, due to Turkmenistan’s lack of options, and then resell the gas 
to Europe’s market at a large markup.  
The pipeline explosion is speculated to be a response to Turkmenistan pursuing an 
alternative route to supply Europe and the start of construction of a pipeline to China in 
2008. The creation of an alternative supply route to China forced Russia to pay a higher 
price to Turkmenistan for gas destined for Europe, due to competition with China.13 
Turkmenistan responded to possible pipeline sabotage, or the perceived reduction in 
reliability of Russia as a transit state, by focusing on supplying China and Iran. In 2014, 
Turkmenistan sold 25.5 bcm of natural gas to China, 9 bcm to Russia, and 6.5 bcm to 
Iran, which is a dramatic shift from 2008, when all of Turkmenistan’s exports required 
Russia assistance for transport to Europe.14 Russia’s speculated use of the “gas weapon” 
as a purchaser was met by diversification of the target’s customer base, and a reluctance 
to continue transactions with Russia, even at market rates. 
2.2.3 Russia-Baltics 
The Baltic states have been some of the most vocal EU members calling for a 
diversification from Russian natural gas supply. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, until 
recently had imported all of their natural gas from individual direct pipelines to Latvia 
and Estonia, and a pipeline from Russia through Belarus en route to Lithuania. These 
countries were not as negatively affected by the 2006, 2009, and 2014 crises as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Henderson, “Russia Potent Gas Weapon?” 
14 Ibid. 
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natural gas they import does not travel via Ukraine, but still felt threatened by potential 
Russian energy coercion.  
Skeptics of the Russian “gas weapon” claim that there is no evidence of said 
weapon in Europe.15 If we assume this claim to be true, the Baltic states still have reason 
to be concerned regarding dependence on Russian gas. First, the Baltic states, and other 
countries that import Russian natural gas, are fully aware of Russia’s actions, or actions 
Russia has been accused of, in Turkmenistan, Georgia, and others. To assume otherwise 
is naive. Second, Russia has used oil exports for political purposes against Lithuania and 
Estonia in recent years. The Baltic states have experienced resource coercion initiated by 
Russia, and thus are prone to distrust and dissuaded from depending on Russian natural 
gas supply, even if there is no evidence of Russia using the “gas weapon.” 
In 2006, Russia shut down the oil pipeline that supplied the Mazeikiu refinery in 
Lithuania, which supplied the Baltic states with refined oil products. This facility was the 
largest source of revenue for the Lithuanian government. Russia claimed that the pipeline 
must be shut down for two years to fix an apparent leak. The timing of this “leak” 
coincided with the sale of Mazeikiu to a Polish firm rather than to competing Russia 
companies. Lithuania adapted to the changing situation and reworked the refinery to 
import oil via naval tanker.16 But, in the short run Russia was able to extract substantial 
costs from Lithuania. 
Estonia too was a target of Russia’s apparent use of an “oil weapon.” In 2007, 
Estonia moved a Soviet war memorial from its capital’s center. In an unlikely 
coincidence, Russian rail shipments of oil to Estonia were stopped for two weeks. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Yafimava, “European Energy Security and the Role of Russian Gas.” 
16 Newnham, “Oil, carrots, and sticks.” 
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shutdown presented a substantial cost to Estonia as freight shipments of other goods, such 
as coal, were also stopped as a result.  
The Baltic fear of dependence on Russia for natural gas makes logical sense given 
the recent history of relations between Russia and the Baltic states in energy markets. 
Russia may not have used coercion of natural gas exports in Europe, but has done so in 
Georgia and Turkmenistan. The Baltic states have been the victim of coercion attempts 
by Russia in oil exports. These events exemplify why states asymmetrically dependent on 
Russian natural gas should have concern regarding the potential for coercion. 
Finally, there is deep historical enmity between most of the countries in Eastern 
Europe and Russia, completely apart from resource-based coercion.  Many decades of 
subjugation by the Soviet Union have caused the citizens of Eastern Europe to view 
Russia’s leadership with fear, mistrust and suspicion. 
Russia’s history of manipulating exports of trade have made its smaller neighbors 
cognizant of the potential threat. Assessing a state’s vulnerability, and the perceived level 
of vulnerability will determine what strategies will be deployed to reduce this 
vulnerability. The next section discusses the relationship between coercive vulnerability 
and strategic adaptation. 
2.3 ANTICIPATORY STRATEGIES REDUCE COERCIVE VULNERABILITY 
Rosemary A. Kelanic offers a framework of anticipatory strategies for countries 
to reduce coercive vulnerability to energy imports. Her framework, as applied to the 
international oil markets, uses the “petroleum deficit” and susceptibility to disruption as 
determinants of coercive vulnerability. The petroleum deficit is the amount of oil 
required for foreign policy goals in excess of domestic production. The susceptibility to 
disruption is based upon geography and the relative power between the importer and 
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exporter.17  These definitions will be applied to the Europe-Russia natural gas market to 
discuss the vulnerability of Russian import partners to coercion. It must be noted that 
natural gas differs from oil in that it is not a factor in terms of military strength or the 
ability to project military power, but a concern in terms of a country’s economic growth 
and comfort in winter months.  Therefore, the “gas deficit” is here defined as the yearly 
natural gas demand required, in excess of domestic production, for the proper functioning 
of the state economy. 
Kelanic classifies these anticipatory strategies as self-sufficiency, indirect control, 
or direct control.18 Self sufficiency would entail increasing domestic production via 
government subsidies, building natural gas storage to defend against supply disruption in 
the short run, or moving toward other fuels or renewable energy resources. An example 
of indirect control is creating strategic partnerships with countries that can supply the 
resource and that are reliable suppliers. Direct control of natural gas resources would be 
the actual conquest of territory in order to obtain strategic resources. This thesis focuses 
on self-sufficiency strategies that can be employed within a country and the potential to 
obtain indirect control via supply agreements with non-Russian sources.  
The current gas production of the case study countries in this analysis is assumed 
to be fixed, though state policy aimed at supporting exploration for new natural gas 
resources would be a self sufficiency strategy.  Finland has no current domestic gas 
production, no history of significant production, and little unexplored potential. Bulgaria 
has negligible domestic gas production, and potential onshore exploration options are 
limited due to a the 2012 moratorium on shale gas exploration. Offshore Black Sea 
exploration is ongoing and the consortium of ExxonMobil, OMV and Petrom has made a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kelanic, “Petroleum Paradox.”  
18 Ibid. 
 12 
significant gas discovery in the Black Sea offshore Romania. This self sufficiency 
strategy is not considered in this analysis due to the speculative nature of gas exploration, 
though significant gas discoveries in the region would lower regional coercive 
vulnerability. 
Within Kelanic’s framework of anticipatory strategies, the countries most 
vulnerable to supply disruption would be most willing to pay for infrastructure 
improvements as anticipatory strategies.19 This falls within Paul Samuelson’s Theory of 
Revealed Preferences, where a consumer’s preferences are revealed based upon their 
purchases.20  In the case of Lithuania, which built LNG import infrastructure, the state’s 
dependence on Russian natural gas (100% in 2013) was perceived as a vulnerability, so 
Lithuania was willing to pay  to reduce the potential cost of coercion and now imports 
50% (2016) of its natural gas from Russia.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
States that are asymmetrically dependent on a trade partner are vulnerable to 
coercion. Many of the countries of Eastern Europe import more than 80% of their natural 
gas from Russia, have smaller economies than Russia, and constitute only a small portion 
of Russia’s natural gas exports indicating asymmetric dependence. The Baltic and 
Visegrad group countries responded to this coercive vulnerability by constructing the 
required infrastructure to have substitute supply potential. This thesis describes a 
framework for the countries that are asymmetrically dependent on Russia and  have yet to 
take anticipatory strategies to reduce vulnerability. The dependence of Eastern European 
states on Russian natural gas and the strategies taken to reduce vulnerability are discussed 
in chapter 3. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kelanic, “Petroleum Paradox.” 
20 Paul A. Samuelson, “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference,” Economica 60 (1948): 
243-253, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2549561. 
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Chapter 3: Dependence on Russian Natural Gas/Anticipatory Strategies 
This chapter examines the strategies that Eastern European countries have taken 
to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas. First, the dependence on Russian natural 
gas of each country is discussed and then the regional responses to reduce dependence are 
described to produce strategies for Eastern European countries still dependent on natural 
gas trade with Russia.  The Baltic states combined the construction of an LNG facility in 
Lithuania with existing Baltic transmission and storage capacity to create a cooperative 
strategy. The Visegrad Group countries reversed the flow of existing pipeline allowing 
access to western European supply. The vulnerability of southeastern European countries, 
the effects of the 2009 crisis on these countries, and their short run responses are 
examined in order to determine strategies to reduce vulnerability. 
3.1 EASTERN EUROPEAN TARGETS FOR GAS COERCION 
For countries, such as Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia, that import more than 80% 
of their annual demand from Russia, the potential for harm via disruption of supplies by 
malfunction or for political blackmail is high. Natural gas is used for industrial purposes, 
such as steel or fertilizer production, and thus a disruption can harm these countries’ 
GDP. In winter months, natural gas is often used for district heating in urban areas, which 
if disrupted will cause great discomfort, and also economic harm as utilities switch to 
costly fuel oil as a substitute or citizens switch to costly electric heating or wood fuel. 
During the 2006 and 2009 natural gas disruptions, prices for electricity rose dramatically 
in many of these countries, and specifically FYR Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Aleksandar Kovacevic, “The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis in South Eastern Europe,” Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, March 2009, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/the-impact-of-the-
russia-ukraine-gas-crisis-in-south-eastern-europe-2/. 
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The European countries that had a larger portion of their natural gas supplied by Russia 
had the most to fear in the 2006 and 2009 supply disruptions, especially those that  
imported gas from Russia via Ukraine. 
Many EU countries were negatively affected by the disruption of natural gas 
supplies from Russia in 2006 and 2009. The debt disputes between Ukraine and Russia 
resulted in a stoppage of supplies delivered through Ukraine harming EU member states, 
including Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Czechia, Italy, and 
Croatia.22 Turkey is the second largest importer of Russian natural gas and was also 
negatively affected by the disruption, but Turkey is not an EU member. 
The countries of the Baltic region, central Europe, and the Balkans are largely  
50-100% dependent on Russian imports. The charts below show the amount of natural 
gas imported from Russia, the total demand of each country, and the percentage of total 
gas consumption coming from Gazprom. These data attempt to quantify the dependence 
of these countries on Russian supply as an initial step to determine state vulnerability to 
gas disruption. The Russian export data was obtained from Gazprom and the 
consumption statistics were provided by the EU Commission, so some inconsistencies 
exist. For example, some countries have a reported gas consumption lower than exports 
reported by Gazprom resulting in a percentage of dependence higher than 100%. The 
inconsistencies may be due to differences in metering systems, difference in temperature 
and pressure at metering locations, leakage from aging Soviet-era pipelines, compression 
fuel requirements, re-exports, or other factors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ariel Cohen and Owen Graham, “European Security and Russia’s Natural Gas Supply Disruption,” The 
Heritage Foundation, January 8, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/node/14776/print-display. 
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3.1.1 Gazprom Exports to Eastern Europe 
. The countries listed in Gazprom’s data as regionally as “Eastern European,” as a 
whole are more than 60% dependent on Russian imports, but have varying levels of 
dependence. All of these countries used over 50% Russian natural gas to fulfill domestic 
demand requirements, except for Czechia, Romania, and Croatia. Czechia imports natural 
gas from western European hubs, and has long-term supply contracts with Norway and 
Russia. Romania and Croatia both satisfy the majority of natural gas demand from 
domestic resources. Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained all of their 
respective natural gas demand from Russian imports. Additionally, Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina both import natural gas from a single upstream transit state. All of 
Macedonia’s imports of Russian natural gas come via Bulgaria, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s via Serbia. These two countries are not only vulnerable to disruption from 
Russia, but also from transit states Serbia and Bulgaria, because in the event of disruption 
upstream, the transit states will choose to fulfill their own demand prior to supplying 
downstream countries. Further, Serbia is only supplied via pipeline from Hungary, 
endangering not only Serbia’s energy security, but also Bosnia-Herzegovina’s. Slovakia 
and Serbia both received more that ninety percent of their natural gas demand from 
Russia. Hungary and Slovenia used Russian resources for more than seventy percent of 
their demand. 
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Country	   Gazprom	  Exports	  	  2016	  (bcm/yr)	  
Natural	  Gas	  Consumption	  
2016	  (bcm/yr)	  
%	  Consumption	  
From	  Gazprom	  
Poland	   11.1	   14.6	   76.03	  
Hungary	   5.7	   8	   71.25	  
Slovakia	   3.7	   3.9	   94.87	  
Czechia	   3.1	   7	   44.29	  
Slovenia	   0.5	   0.7	   71.43	  
Croatia	   0.8	   2.2	   36.36	  
Serbia	   1.9	   2	   95.00	  
Romania	   1.7	   9	   18.89	  
Bulgaria	   3.2	   2.7	   118.52	  
Greece	   2.7	   4.1	   65.85	  
Bosnia-­‐Herze	   0.2	   0.2	   100.00	  
Macedonia	   0.2	   0.2	   100.00	  
Total	   34.8	   54.6	   63.74	  
Table 1: Dependence of Eastern European Countries23 
For comparison, Germany’s imports from Gazprom in 2016 were 57.9 bcm, 
which is larger than the total for all “Eastern European” countries at 34.8 bcm. The 
Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey all imported between 24 and 27 bcm 
from Russia in 2016. 
3.1.2 Dependence of Baltic States, Finland, and Major FSU Transit States 
In general, the Baltic states, Finland, and the major Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
transit states showed high levels of dependence on Russian gas in 2016. Latvia, Estonia, 
Finland, Moldova, and Belarus were more than 80% dependent on imports from Russia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Consumption Data (EU countries) 
EU Commission, “Energy Data Sheets:EU28 Countries,” February 14, 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-analysis/country. 
Consumption Data (Non-EU countries) 
BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2017. 
Gazprom Export Data Gazprom,	  “The	  Power	  Within:	  Gazprom	  Factbook	  2012-­‐2016,”	  2017,	  www.gazprom.com/f/posts/44/307258/gazprom-­‐in-­‐figures-­‐2012-­‐2016-­‐en.pdf.	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Lithuania imported about half of its natural gas from Russia, and half from Norway as 
LNG.24 Ukraine has made an effort in recent years to reduce its imports, and now only 
receives 9.2% of its natural gas consumption from Russia due to reverse flows from 
western Europe.  
 
Country	   Gazprom	  Exports	  2016	  (bcm/yr)	  
Natural	  Gas	  Consumption	  
2016	  (bcm/yr)	  
%	  Consumption	  
From	  Gazprom	  
Lithuania	   0.90	   1.80	   50.00	  
Latvia	   1.30	   1.10	   118.18	  
Estonia	   0.40	   0.40	   100.00	  
Finland	   2.50	   2.10	   119.05	  
Moldova	   3.00	   3.50	   85.71	  
Belarus	   18.30	   15.30	   119.61	  
Ukraine	   2.40	   26.10	   9.20	  
Table 2: Dependence of Baltic States, Finland, and FSU Transit States25 
3.1.3 Asymmetric Dependence 
Resource coercion is most effective when the coercing state has a much larger 
economy than the target state. When the coercing state’s economy is larger than the target 
state, the relative costs of coercion are less for the state with the larger economy. For 
example, the GDP of Russia is US$1.28T and the GDP of Moldova is only US$47.41B.26 
So if we assume for this example that harm caused to Moldova by coercion and the cost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Reuters Staff, “Norway to Surpass Russia as Lithuania’s top gas supplier in 2016,” Reuters, February 8, 
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/lithuania-gas/norway-to-surpass-russia-as-lithuanias-top-gas-
supplier-in-2016-idUSL8N15N1UF. 
25 Consumption Data (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland) 
EU Commission, “Energy Data Sheets:EU28 Countries,” February 14, 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-analysis/country 
Consumption Data (Non-EU countries: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) 
BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” June 2017. 
Gazprom Export Data 
Gazprom, “The Power Within: Gazprom Factbook 2012-2016,” 2017, 
www.gazprom.com/f/posts/44/307258/gazprom-in-figures-2012-2016-en.pdf. 
26 “GDP (current US$),” World Bank,  accessed April 24, 2018, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map. 
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of coercion for Russia are equal in nominal terms, the relative cost of coercion is much 
higher for Moldova than Russia due to the relative size of the states’ economies. In 
contrast, Germany’s economy is US$3.47T, so it would potentially have the upper hand 
in terms of the relative harm due to a disruption of trade, when compared to Russia.  
The Eastern European countries discussed have economies smaller than Russia’s. 
Table 3 below shows the GDP of the countries discussed in Tables 1 and 2.  The small 
size relative of these economies to Russia makes them better targets for coercion than 
larger economies such as Germany. 
 
Country	   2016	  GDP	  ($trillions)	   Country2	  
2016	  GDP	  
($trillions)	  
Poland	   0.47	   Bosnia-­‐Herze	   0.02	  
Hungary	   0.13	   Macedonia	   0.01	  
Slovakia	   0.09	   Lithuania	   0.04	  
Czechia	   0.20	   Latvia	   0.03	  
Slovenia	   0.04	   Estonia	   0.02	  
Croatia	   0.05	   Finland	   0.24	  
Serbia	   0.04	   Moldova	   0.01	  
Romania	   0.19	   Belarus	   0.05	  
Bulgaria	   0.05	   Ukraine	   0.09	  
Greece	   0.19	   	   	  
	   	   Russia	   1.28	  
Table 3: Russia to Eastern European States GDP27 
3.2 RESPONSES BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY 
The small economies of Eastern Europe that are highly dependent on Russia for 
natural gas are potentially vulnerable to supply disruption and coercion. If the cost to 
build infrastructure to provide substitute supply is less than the cost of being targeted for 
coercive action, the target state will choose to build.  The EU, through its Third Energy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “GDP (current US$),” World Bank. 
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Package, and individual countries invested in strategies for substitution of natural gas 
imports, which is discussed below. These strategies are applied to Bulgaria and Finland 
in order to estimate costs for each country for comparison.  
3.2.1 Baltic States: LNG Import and Cooperative Strategy 
The Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – have created a sub-regional 
import and transmission system that can fully replace Russian imports. In 2014, this was 
achieved by the opening of the Lithuania’s Klaipeda LNG import facility coupled with 
existing pipeline interconnections between the countries and Latvia’s Incukalns 
underground storage facility (UGS). In 2016, Lithuania imported half of its natural gas as 
LNG, while Estonia and Latvia still were supplied by Russia. However, if required, the 
Klaipeda facility’s import capacity of 4 bcm/yr could cover the 3.3 bcm demanded by the 
Baltic states in 2016. Further, the 2.2 bcm of Latvian storage at Incukalns could be 
accessed to account for seasonal variability and the substantial oil shale resources of 
Estonia could be used as backup fuel in disruption.  
The map below shows the natural gas infrastructure of the Baltic states. The light 
blue circle in Lithuania is the Klaipeda LNG import facility. The white icon in Latvia, 
which looks like the opening to a train tunnel, is the Incukalns UGS. Note that gas must 
be transported via Lithuania in order for Russia to deliver gas to Kaliningrad. As noted 
previously, all three Baltic states are connected via pipeline, but Finland is not yet 
connected to Estonia via the Gulf of Finland. Finland’s only connection to natural gas 
infrastructure is via Russia. The Baltic states have reduced vulnerability to Russian 
natural gas coercion by the construction of an LNG facility and supporting pipeline, yet 
Finland is still disconnected from the larger European natural gas transmission network 
and thus is vulnerable to coercion by Russian via natural gas trade. 
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Figure 1: Map of Baltic Natural Gas Infrastructure28 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 European Network of Transmission Systems Operators, “The European Natural Gas Network 2017,” 
ENTSOG, 
https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Maps/2017/ENTSOG_CAP_2017_A0_1189x841_
FULL_064.pdf. 
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3.2.2 LNG as a Substitute for Russian Supply 
The addition of LNG import capacity to Eastern European countries allows these 
countries to use LNG as a substitute for Russian gas supplied by pipeline. Historically, 
long-term supply contracts dominated LNG trade, but spot markets are increasingly being 
utilized as the LNG market  becomes less regional and more globally integrated.  The EU 
currently has roughly 200 bcm/yr of LNG import capacity, which could in theory replace 
all Russian imports (165 bcm/yr) to the EU, and only 23% of this capacity was utilized in 
2014.29 The problem for Eastern European countries subject to coercive vulnerability is 
that much of this capacity is in western Europe and without a fully interconnected 
European transmission grid, this capacity is not accessible. The construction of LNG 
import capacity in Eastern Europe gives these countries the ability to make long term 
supply contracts to substitute all or a portion of Russian supply or to use spot markets to 
fulfill short-term supply disruption. Both of these would be considered indirect control  
strategies, but a supply contract would depend on the reliability of an exporting state, 
while a spot market strategy relies on the functioning of the global LNG market. 
During the 2009 supply disruption, LNG supplies were re-routed to import 
facilities in Greece and Turkey in order to assist the countries of southeast Europe that 
had pipeline access to this regasification. The Greek LNG import facility, Revithoussa 
was supplied with LNG from Egypt.30 Additional LNG from Oman, was re-routed from 
Spain to Turkey to fulfill obligations to both Greece and Bulgaria and additional supplies 
of LNG were received by Turkey via Algeria.31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 IGU World LNG Report – 2015 Edition, http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-field_file/IGU-
World%20LNG%20Report-2015%20Edition.pdf. 
Lukas Bresser et.al, “The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis on European Gas Security & Infrastructure 
Investment,” Columbia University SIPA Capstone Final Report – Credit Agricole, May 3, 2015, 
https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Credit%20Agricole%202015.pdf. 
30 Kovacevic, “The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis in South Eastern Europe.” 
31 Ibid. 
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 Ultimately, an additional 2.5 Mcm/day of natural gas was imported at 
Revithoussa to be sent to Bulgaria via pipeline through Greece.32 This gas was provided 
via a method called a “linepack,” where the pipe is essentially used as large storage 
container. Transport is achieved by increasing pressure by adding more gas, rather than 
the use of compressors to move the fuel.33 This method, though costly, was required 
because the appropriate compression was not available to reverse the flow of the pipeline 
that normally supplies Greece from Russia via Romania and Bulgaria.34 The response to 
the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis exemplifies the efficacy of LNG regasification 
terminals as a response for coastal states in southeast Europe to a short-term disruption of 
Russian supply.  
Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia were two countries of southeastern 
Europe with coastal access but without an LNG import facility or domestic natural gas 
production in 2009. Neither country had underground gas storage. Without the 
appropriate gas infrastructure these two countries were affected by the shutoff of natural 
gas from Gazprom due not only to lack of access to maritime LNG markets, but also to 
the distance from Russian supply, lack of appropriate backup fuel capacity, and a lack of 
appropriate compression which would have allowed other countries the give backup 
resources to Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia. Both countries saw a 100% 
shortfall in natural gas demand due to the Gazprom shutoff of supplies.35 
LNG is a viable  substitute for Russian natural gas if a country has a LNG onshore 
import facility, hosts an FSRU, or has access to another country’s import capacity. Long 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Kovacevic, “The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis in South Eastern Europe.” 
33 Northwest Gas Association blog, “Natural Gas Term of the Week: Line Pack,” NWGA: Northwest Gas 
Association, June 22, 2012, https://www.nwga.org/natural-gas-term-of-the-week-line-pack/. 
34 Florent Silve and Pierre Noel, “Cost Curves for Gas Supply Security: The Case of Bulgaria,” The 
University of Cambridge Electricity Policy Research Group, September 2010, 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242081. 
35 Kovacevic, “The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis in South Eastern Europe.” 
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term supply contracts are dependent on the reliability of the supplier and spot market 
access is dependent on the functioning of the global LNG market. 
3.2.3 Visegrad Group: Reverse Flow and Increased Interconnection Strategy 
Reversing the flow of existing pipelines and interconnecting state transmission 
systems have provided access to substitute supply for the countries of the Visegrad 
Group. These countries act as transit states for Russian natural gas that has first passed 
through Belarus or Ukraine. The pipeline infrastructure had, for the most part, only 
flowed east to west prior to the infrastructure upgrades post-2009. When supply was 
reduced through Ukraine, these countries had to choose between supplying domestic 
needs or fulfilling responsibilities to countries downstream. Reversing the flow of these 
transit pipelines gave these countries the option to import natural gas from western 
Europe to fulfill domestic demand and to supply countries to the east, such as Ukraine. 
The interconnection to German supply and the potential to re-route Russian supplies via 
the Nord Stream have given these countries access to natural gas in the event of a 
shutdown of transmission through Ukraine or Belarus. Now, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, 
and Poland have positioned themselves as natural gas hubs by enhancing their abilities as 
transit states. 
The result of these projects is a large amount of west-to-east flow capacity in 
central and eastern Europe (Table 4). Czechia has access to 53.6 bcm/yr of west-to-east 
capacity in excess of its domestic consumption requirement. This is largely due to the 
construction of the OPAL pipeline which has a capacity of 35 bcm/yr and connects to the 
Nord Stream pipeline in Germany.36 Hungary has an excess west-to-east capacity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Anders Norlen, “The lifting of OPAL capacity restrictions leads to shifting gas flows of Nord Stream,’ 
McKinsey&Company Energy Insights, September 2017, 
https://www.mckinseyenergyinsights.com/insights/the-lifting-of-opal-capacity-restrictions-leads-to-
shifting-gas-flows-on-nord-stream/. 
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6.1bcm/yr, and has substantial underground storage capacity of 6.3 bcm.37 Poland has  3.3 
bcm/yr in excess pipeline capacity plus an additional 5bcm/yr of LNG capacity.38 
Slovakia has positioned itself as a hub and transit state with an east-to-west import 
capacity in excess of its demand of 14.6 bcm/yr and 14.6 bcm/yr of pipeline capacity 
flowing into Ukraine.39 Ukraine has the advantage of its domestic resources, and if 
coupled to the west-to-east capacity flowing through Slovakia and Hungary, the country 
no longer  needs to import Russian gas for its domestic consumption. In the event of a 
disruption from Russia, there would be adjustment costs for re-routing natural gas flows 
and slower delivery. In addition, the transmission infrastructure of each country may not 
be suitable to distribute gas to all portions of each country. But, conceivably based upon 
yearly numbers, central and eastern European countries are protected from a supply 
disruption, assuming that the Nord Stream pipeline is also not shut down. 
 
Country	  
West-­‐East	  flow	  into	  Country	  (bcm/yr)	   Domestic	  production	  (bcm/yr)	   Domestic	  Consumption	  (bcm/yr)	  
Excess	  capacity	  in	  event	  of	  disruption	  (bcm/yr)	  Czechia	   61.2	   0.3	   7.9	   53.6	  Hungary	   13.3	   1.8	   9	   6.1	  Poland	   15.5	   6.1	   18.3	   3.3	  Slovakia	   19.1	   0.1	   4.6	   14.6	  Ukraine	   22.2	   19.0	   41.1	   0.1	  
Table 4: Reverse Flow Capacity Central and Eastern European States40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Directorate-General for Energy: Internal Energy Market, “The role of gas storage in internal market and 
in ensuring security of supply,” 2015, 19, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/REPORT-
Gas%20Storage-20150728.pdf. 
38 “Polish LNG terminal in Swinoujscie to open May ’16,” Radio Poland, September 16, 2015, 
http://www.thenews.pl/1/12/Artykul/221380,Polish-LNG-terminal-in-Swinoujscie-to-open-May-16. 
39 Colin Harrison and Zuzana Princova, “A Quiet gas revolution in Central and Eastern Europe,” Energy 
Post, October 29, 2015, http://energypost.eu/quiet-revolution-central-eastern-european-gas-market/ 
40 Ibid. 
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Figure 2: Visegrad Group Reverse Flow Interconnections41 
3.2.4 Nord Stream and German-Russia Interdependence 
The reverse flow strategy of the Visegrad Group requires the continued function 
of the Nord Stream pipeline. The following will discuss the high cost for either Germany 
or Russia to shut down the Nord Stream in a coercion attempt. Due to these high costs, it 
is reasonable to assume the Nord Stream pipeline would not be shut down. 
Germany is currently Russia’s biggest customer and imported 53.4 bcm of gas 
from Gazprom in 2017. Given that Gazprom’s total 2017 exports were 192.2 bcm, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid. 
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shutting down export to Germany would amount to losing 27% of its export revenue. 
This amounts to roughly $11B in export sales revenue if a potential blockade were to last 
for a year or roughly one-fifth of Gazprom’s market cap.42 Therefore, because Germany is 
Russia’s largest customer, and Russia cannot control what happens to natural gas after it 
is exported to Germany, the states of central and eastern Europe would likely not be 
targeted by Russia with coercion via a natural gas disruption due to the reverse flow 
capacity built in the years after the 2006 and 2009 disruptions. It can be argued that an 
interdependent relationship between Germany and Russia exists in terms of natural gas 
due to the large imports of Russian gas by Germany, capital cost of building the offshore 
Nord Stream pipeline, and the burden that would be placed on both countries if either 
were to attempt coercion.43 Due to this interdependence, Russia would be highly unlikely 
to attempt to coerce central or eastern European states because it would risk losing 
Germany as a customer. 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Gazprom, “Multipolar Energy: Factbook ‘Gazprom in Figures 2011-2015’,” 2016, 80, 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/12/001311/gazprom-in-figures-2011-2015-en.pdf. 
43 Keohane and Nye, Power and Independence. 
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Chapter 4: Natural Gas Infrastructure Pricing Assumptions 	  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the creation of a state’s natural gas infrastructure, there are three main required 
components. The first is a source of natural gas, which could be provided by domestic 
resource endowment, natural gas piped into the country, or a coastal regasification import 
facility. Once in the country, the transmission infrastructure is necessary to distribute the 
gas to households, industrial end-users, district heating facilities and power plants for 
electricity generation. This pipeline infrastructure requires the appropriate compression 
capabilities to transport said gas throughout the country. Currently some countries 
already have appropriate compression and pipelines, in one direction, but may require 
additional compression in order to reverse flows of natural gas from secondary source 
countries in the event of a supply disruption. Lastly, underground storage facilities (UGS) 
can assist in responding to variability in supply and demand, but also can serve as a short-
term solution in the event of a supply disruption. The underground storage facilities must 
be connected to appropriate transmission infrastructure so that the areas where natural gas 
is demanded can be supplied by these UGSs, and these facilities must also be able to 
discharge enough natural gas per day to meet demand in order to actually reduce coercive 
vulnerability. Domestic resources, pipelines, import facilities, storage, and compression 
all work together in order to provide a state’s natural gas needs.  
This section describes the infrastructure pricing assumptions that are employed to 
estimate options for Finland and Bulgaria to substitute Russia supply. The pricing 
assumptions for the initial capital expenditures (CAPEX) and for the long run yearly 
operating expenditures (OPEX) are based on the reported prices of recent projects and 
relevant literature. 
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4.2 LNG IMPORT FACILITIES 
4.2.1 Coastal Natural Gas Regasification Facilities 
In recent years, both Lithuania and Poland have built LNG import infrastructure 
in their respective coastal areas. Lithuania’s Klaipeda facility hosts a floating storage 
regasification unit (FSRU) with an import capacity of 4 bcm/yr or 3.08 MTPA.44 The 
total storage provided by the unit is 170 kcm of LNG, or roughly 235 Mcm of natural 
gas, which is the equivalent of about a month of Lithuania’s natural gas consumption 
today.45 The total cost of the coastal infrastructure was a reported US$128 M, and 
Lithuania leases the FSRU so its cost is not reported as CAPEX.46 Poland’s regasification 
LNG import facility, Swinoujscie LNG, is an onshore terminal with a capacity of 5 
bcm/yr or 3.85 MTPA; the facility has LNG storage tanks with an overall capacity of 320 
kcm. The total reported cost of the Swinoujscie facility was US$642 M.47 
 Onshore LNG facilities often have a higher CAPEX than FSRUs. Typically, the 
construction of cryogenic storage tanks is the most costly and time consuming portion of 
the construction of an onshore LNG regasification facility.48 Safety regulations are often 
more stringent for onshore storage facilities due to regulations to protect against breach 
of the storage and land use restriction and permitting. Prices vary depending on local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 1 m3 natural gas = 7.692 * 10-4 tonnes LNG 
MTPA represents mega tonnes Per Annum or 106tonnes per year 
“Natural Gas Conversion Pocketbook,” International Gas Union (IGU), 2012. 
45 Gas LNG Europe LNG MAP Database 2016 
Lithuania’s natural gas consumption in 2015 was 2.2bcm and was reduced to 1.9bcm in 2016.  
EU Commission, Energy datasheets: EU28 countries 
46 Andrius Sytas, “Lithuania installs LNG terminal to end dependence on Russian gas,” Daily Mail, 
October 27 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-2809932/Lithuania-installs-LNG-
terminal-end-dependence-Russian-gas.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490. 
47 “Polish LNG terminal in Swinoujscie to open May ’16,” Radio Poland, September 16, 2015, 
http://www.thenews.pl/1/12/Artykul/221380,Polish-LNG-terminal-in-Swinoujscie-to-open-May-16 
47 Marek Strezelecki, “Poland Opens LNG Terminal, Pledges to End Russian Dependence,’ Bloomberg, 
October 12, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-12/poland-opens-lng-terminal-
pledges-to-end-russian-gas-dependence. 
48 Michael D. Tusiani and Gordon Shearer, LNG A Nontechnical Guide, (Tulsa: Penwell Corporation, 
2007). 
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conditions such as level of regulation, land acquisition cost, access to local power supply 
for the facility, connection to pipeline infrastructure, dredging requirements, labor and 
construction costs, and gasification technology.49  
Brian Songhurst of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies estimates the cost 
difference between two 3 MTPA (4.1 bcm/yr) import facilities with180 kcm of storage, 
one onshore and one new-build FSRU including its coastal infrastructure (Table 6). The 
onshore facility was estimated to cost US$750 M, US$300 M more than a comparably 
sized FSRU facility including the vessel. The onshore facility requires additional CAPEX 
due to unloading lines (US$100 M), a storage tank (US$180 M), the 
processing/regasification plant ($100 M), and electrical production facilities ($60 M). 
The estimated FSRU cost is US$250 M with an additional coastal infrastructure cost of 
US$30 M. Both projections had an estimated jetty cost of US$80 M.50  Many of the 
features required for an onshore facility are built into the FSRU, and according to 
Songhurst, at lower cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Tusiani and Shearer, LNG A Nontechnical Guide. 
50 Brian Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs),” The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, OIES Paper: NG 123, July 2017. 
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Component	  	  
Onshore	  
($M)	  
FSRU	  	  
($M)	  
Jetty	  Including	  Piping	   80	   80	  
Unloading	  Lines	   100	   N/A	  
Storage	  Tanks	   180	   in	  FSRU	  
FSRU	  Vessel	   N/A	   250	  
Process	  Plant	   100	   in	  FSRU	  
Utilities	   60	   in	  FSRU	  
Onshore	  Interface/Infrastructure	   N/A	   30	  
CAPEX	   520	   360	  
Contingency	  30%	  Onshore,	  10%	  FSRU	   156	   36	  
Owner's	  Costs	   74	   54	  
Total	  CAPEX	   750	   450	  
Table 5: Oxford Cost Comparison Onshore Facility v. FSRU 51 
LNG import facility pricing reports by the consultancy firm Data Fusion 
Associates, the natural gas lobby International Gas Union, and the Songhurst Oxford 
study are discussed below and compare the reported CAPEX for LNG import in 
Lithuania and Poland. DataFusion Associates estimates that the CAPEX for a FSRU 
would be US$109/t in 2017, or roughly $83M/bcm of yearly import capacity.52 Based on 
the DataFusion Associate estimate, the Lithuanian Klaipeda facility should have cost 
US$335 M, which includes the FSRU and onshore infrastructure.53 The International Gas 
Union (IGU), which is an association that lobbies for technical and economic progress in 
natural gas, reported that the CAPEX for FSRUs was US$78/t in 2016, down 
significantly from US$158/t in 2014.54 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies came to a 
similar estimate for CAPEX, at US$236-280 M, for  new build facilities with 170-
173.400 kcm storage and 4.4-11.4 bcm/yr send-out capacity.55 This storage size is similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs).” 
52 From this point on metric tons or tonnes is represented as t 
53 FSRU’s: A Real Game Changer, DataFusion Associates, January 2017. 
54 IGU, 2017 World LNG Report, International Gas Union, sponsored by Chevron, 53. 
55 Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs).” 
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to that for the Klaipeda facility but almost triple the send-out capacity. In general, it 
appears that the send out capacity does not lead to much variation in CAPEX as shown 
by the table below, which is a price comparison done by the Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies for 2017 FSRU contract values. The pricing for these FSRUs, which are 
appropriate size for Bulgaria and Finland, appears to be driven mostly by the size of the 
storage, and thus the size of the vessel rather than the send out capacity, though some 
difference in price exists. 	  
	  
Figure 3: 2017 New Build FSRU Contract Values56 
A cost estimate for a southeastern European LNG import facility under 
construction is on par with the cost estimates above. Currently, Croatia has an FSRU 
import project at the island of Krk estimated to cost US$386 M and has an initial capacity 
of 2 bcm/yr.57 This project was approved for US$108.6 M in funding from the EU 
Commission under the EU Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in 2017 and is projected to 
be complete in 2019. The US$386 M price tag includes the purchase of a FSRU and the 
associated coastal infrastructure costs. Croatia currently covers 70% of its 2.7 bcm/yr 
natural gas demand with domestic resources.58 Therefore, this facility is planned to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 million metric tonnes LNG = 1.38 billion cubic meters natural gas 
56 Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs).” 
57 LNG World News Staff, “Croatian LNG terminal granted EU funds, LNG World News, February 17, 
2017, http://www.lngworldnews.com/croatian-lng-terminal-granted-eu-funds/. 
58 “Croatia,” European Commission Country Reports, 2014, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_countryreports_croatia.pdf 
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used not only to fulfill Croatia’s import requirements, but also to supply Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Hungary, and Slovenia via existing pipelines, and also Serbia if an 
interconnection is constructed.59 The final construction cost of this facility, which plans to 
become a regional natural gas hub, is still unknown, but the current cost estimate required 
for EU financing seems on par with the estimates used in this thesis. 
 
.	   	  
Figure 4: Croatia, Krk LNG as a Potential Regional Natural Gas Hub60 	  
The cost estimates for FSRU coastal infrastructure vary due to additional 
construction and infrastructure requirements, such as jetty construction, offshore buoy 
construction or submarine pipeline development. The existence of these costs are not 
often reported, but for purposes of this thesis, the capital cost price for a Klaipeda-sized 
FSRU vessel with a storage capacity of 170 kcm is estimated at US$236-280 M, based 
upon the Oxford Study. In addition, there are the costs associated with the construction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “LNG Regasification Terminal Krk, Croatia,” LNG Hrvatska, July 2015 
http://lng.hr/upload_data/editor/files/LNG%20terminal%20Krk_presentation_Open%20Season.pdf. 
60 Ina Vukic, “Croatian President Boosting Prospects for EU Independence From Russian Energy 
Supplies,” Croatia, The War, and The Future, October 14, 2015, https://inavukic.com/2015/10/14/croatian-
president-boosting-prospects-for-eu-independence-from-russian-energy-supplies/. 
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onshore infrastructure in order to import and distribute the natural gas. The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies estimates these costs as US$80 M for the construction of a 
jetty and piping, with an additional cost called “onshore interface/infrastructure,” of 
US$30 M.61 This total onshore terminal cost of US$110 M in addition to the roughly 
US$236-280 M for the FSRU coincides with DataFusion’s CAPEX estimate of 
US$109/t. Therefore, the overall CAPEX estimate for an FSRU facility to be used in this 
thesis is US$346-390 M, which is consistent with the estimates make by DataFusion, 
Oxford, and the reported price for the Croatian Krk facility. 
It is be assumed here that the flexibility of FSRUs as opposed to onshore facilities 
will outweigh any potential for either of the two case study states, Bulgaria and Finland, 
to build an onshore facility. Both Bulgaria and Finland have an annual natural gas 
demand less than 4 bcm/yr. If either of these countries were to switch to another energy 
source, the FSRU could be used as an LNG tanker, and bring in delivery revenues, or be 
employed as a storage facility for other countries bringing in addition revenues. The 
FSRU also allows owners arbitrage opportunities in the event of a shock to international 
gas markets. Charter contract periods have also come down in recent years, from the 15-
year standard charter contract for the first FSRU leases in 2007. Today the contracts 
range from six months to twenty years. Egypt is preparing to develop its offshore natural 
gas resources and has opted to lease an FSRU for six month terms to bridge the gap until 
domestic resources come online. The flexibility provided by an FSRU, in addition to the 
lower CAPEX, make it ideal for countries with smaller demand requirements and the 
option to switch to other fuels.   
The large natural gas demand of Poland, 14.9 bcm/yr, may have made the 
Swinoujscie LNG facility a smart long run decision, as the country is not likely to reduce 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs).” 
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natural gas demand in the short run, and is actually likely to increase natural gas demand 
as it attempts to move away from coal-based power.  The added storage of the Polish 
facility has allowed Poland to further its position as a distribution hub for natural gas 
between Germany and western Europe, the Baltic States, and the Visegrad Group, but it 
must be noted that the storage at Swinoujscie only amounts to about one half month of 
Poland yearly demand. Additionally, a movement toward low carbon energy production 
may make natural gas a less preferred fuel type if renewables or nuclear are adopted. It is 
not easy to predict natural gas markets in perpetuity, but, while unlikely, an increase in 
natural gas price may make coal an attractive option again for electricity production, 
making an onshore natural regasification facility a lost sunk cost. 
Another option for a country with a lower demand for natural gas is to build the 
distribution infrastructure for an FSRU and then to lease the FSRU itself from an LNG 
operating firm.  Lithuania has chosen a FSRU lease strategy but has also announced its 
hope to exercise its option to purchase the FSRU from Hoegh LNG. The financing costs 
of the Klaipeda FSRU is US$189,000 per day, or US$424 M over the course of the ten-
year lease with Hoegh, much larger than the roughly US$250 M it would cost to buy the 
FSRU upfront.62 Though Lithuania has  expressed interest in purchasing the facility,  
Hoegh LNG has refused to let Lithuania out of its lease obligation.63 The lease option will 
not be considered for case study countries, Bulgaria and Finland, because it has been 
shown by Lithuania’s case to be a better investment to purchase rather than lease, 
especially if it is assumed that the global LNG market is moving toward integration. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Present value, 10% discount rate, US$69M per year 
Remejo Nuoroda, Klaipedos Nafta signs floating storage and regasification unit contract with Hoegh 
LNG,” EN.15MIN.LT, March 2, 2012, https://www.15min.lt/en/article/business/klaipedos-nafta-signs-
floating-storage-and-regasification-unit-contract-with-hoegh-lng-527-200638. 
63 TallinLNG, “Norway’s Hoegh LNG turns down Lithuania’s proposal on FSRO,” 
http://www.tallinnlng.com/norways-hoegh-lng-turns-down-lithuanias-proposal-on-fsru-advance-sale/. 
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4.2.2 LNG Import Facility Operating Expenses 
In addition to the CAPEX there is the yearly operating expense (OPEX) of an 
LNG import facility. The Oxford Study on FSRUs estimates OPEX to be 2.5% of 
CAPEX per year as a rule of thumb.64  This operating cost consists largely of the 
manpower requirements of the vessel.65 There is also an LNG surcharge involved with 
purchasing the fuel via the maritime LNG market. Due to the process of liquefying the 
natural gas, transporting via tanker, and regasification, an additional cost must be 
estimated. Currently, for example, Lithuania still imports half of its natural gas by 
pipeline from Russia, though it has the option to fully replace Russian natural gas with 
LNG. It continues pipeline imports due to the increased price of LNG when compared to 
pipeline transported natural gas.  
Recent studies that have reported the addition costs for a country to import LNG, 
as opposed to pipeline natural gas, can used to estimate an LNG surcharge. American 
natural gas firm Cheniere Energy reports that it charges US$2.25-3.50/MMbtu for its 
liquefaction services at its Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi export facilities.66 The higher 
end of the range includes financing charges for the construction of the greenfield Corpus 
Christi project. The Center for Energy Economics (CEE) estimated the shipping cost 
from these facilities to Europe at US$1.25-1.50/MMbtu.67  A 2017 report by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration reported that China has been paying US$1.00/MMbtu 
for regasification of its LNG imports. Using these recent pricing assumptions, the price 
per bcm of LNG imports is shown in the table below.68 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs).” 
65 “FSRU’s: A Real Game Changer,” DataFusion Associates, January 2017. 
66 Andy Flower, “LNG Supply Outlook 2016 to 2030,” Center for Energy Economics: Global Gas/LNG 
Research, July 2016.  
67 Ibid. 
68 EIA, “EIA Weekly Natural Gas Update,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 6, 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/archivenew_ngwu/2017/09_07/. 
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Portion	  of	  LNG	  Delivery	  	   $	  per	  MMbtu	   Millions	  of	  $	  per	  bcm	  Liquefaction	  (High)	   3.5	   126	  Liquefaction	  (Low)	   2.25	   81	  Shipping	  (High)	   1.5	   54	  Shipping	  (Low)	   1.25	   45	  Regasification	   1	   36	  Total	  (high)	   6	   216	  Total	  (low)	   4.5	   162	  	  
Table 6: LNG Surcharge per Unit Estimate 
In summary, the use of an LNG regasification import facility can give coastal 
countries a more diversified portfolio of import options. FSRUs offer more flexibility and 
lower capital costs than onshore import facilities, and thus are selected for use in the case 
study price estimates for Bulgaria and Finland. FSRU vessels, in recent years, have cost 
roughly US$236-280 M and the onshore infrastructure costs about US$80 M, for a total 
of $346-390 M per 170 kcm facility. The 2.5% of CAPEX per year rule of thumb is used 
to estimate OPEX in addition to the LNG surcharge of US$162 M-216 M/bcm-yr. 
4.3 PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERCONNECTORS 
The price of natural gas pipelines varies based upon local geography, population 
density, local regulation, the world price of steel, the global demand for pipelines, and 
many other factors. Pipelines are used to reduce coercive vulnerability by connecting 
end-use demand centers to new sources of natural gas. For example, a pipeline is required 
to connect coastal LNG import facilities to urban centers for use in district heating. 
Pipelines can also be used to connect a demand center to another country that has more 
robust domestic natural gas resources.  	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4.3.1 Pipeline Capacity 
The capacity of a given pipeline depends on the diameter of the pipeline. The 
International Gas Union (IGU) Natural Gas Conversion Pocketbook gives estimated 
pipeline capacities based on the diameter of a given pipeline in inches but notes that these 
“numbers can vary widely.” The inch diameters have been converted to mm for this 
thesis and are shown in Table 3.3 below. 	   diameter	  (in)	   diameter	  (mm)	   Capacity	  (bcm/yr)	  20	   508	   2	  24	   609.6	   3.2	  28	   711.2	   4.7	  32	   812.8	   6.6	  36	   914.4	   9	  40	   1016	   11.7	  44	   1117.6	   14.9	  	  
Table 7: Pipeline Capacities by Diameter69 
Pipeline import capacity must be large enough to service the demand 
requirements of a given country if it is meant be a viable substitute for Russia supply. For 
example, Klaipeda’s import capacity (4 bcm/yr) could not replace Russian gas for the 
Baltic region without appropriate pipeline capacity between countries. The three 
countries are connected by 700 mm pipeline which offers 4.5 bcm/yr capacity. This gives 
all three countries access to the LNG import capacity and the Latvian UGS facility. The 
storage facility is key because the Baltic states prefer to buy natural gas in the summer 
when prices are historically lower and discharge the gas for use in the winter for use in 
heating facilities when demand, and thus price is highest. The interconnection also allows 
for a greater amount of imports from the Klaipeda LNG facility if necessary. The 700 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 “Natural Gas Conversion Pocketbook,” International Gas Union (IGU), 2012. 
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mm option is a prudent choice because the Baltic countries’ overall demand for natural 
gas was 3.3 bcm in 2016.70 The decision to use a 700mm pipeline as interconnectors 
between the Baltic states more than satisfies the yearly demand requirements of the three 
countries, allowing them all access to Klaipeda LNG and Incukalns UGS, and reducing 
all three countries’ coercive vulnerability. 
The pipeline requirements for the case study countries, Bulgaria and Finland, are 
similarly to the Baltic states, thus pipeline construction pricing and interconnectors are 
estimated using 700 mm pipeline with a capacity of 4.5 bcm/yr in line with the IGU 
estimate. Bulgaria has a yearly demand of 2.9 bcm/yr and Finland’s yearly demand is 2.2 
bcm/yr, therefore the 700 mm pipeline can satisfy the countries’ yearly demand 
requirements. Additionally, existing pipeline routes are assumed to be appropriate to 
connect natural gas supply to demand centers in order to reduce the right-of-way (ROW) 
costs associated with using new routes. 	   	  
4.3.2 Literature on Pipeline Pricing 
Many price estimates exist for natural gas pipelines. The Songhurst study on 
FSRUs stated that for pipelines with a diameter of 609.6–762 mm the cost would be 
US$2–3 M per km for onshore pipeline and $3-4 M for offshore pipeline.71 This would 
amount to a range of US$3281/km-mm to US$3937/km-mm for onshore pipeline and 
US$4921/km-mm to US$5249/km-mm for offshore pipeline. The Oxford Study does not 
specify if the cost of compressors is included. In 2006, using 2001 data, the Center for 
Energy Economics (CEE) estimated US$1114/km-mm for onshore 700 mm pipeline and 
US$2142/km-mm for offshore 700 mm pipeline, which seems low when compared to the 
Oxford numbers, but the study also specifies that “cost escalation may be more than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 EU Commission, Energy datasheets: EU28 countries. 
71 Songhurst, “The Outlook for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs).” 
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50%.” However, even at a 50% premium the CEE estimates seem low when compared to 
the Oxford estimate. In 2009, ICF International estimated a pipeline construction price 
that seems more in line with the CEE estimate but for pipelines larger than the 700 mm, 
ranging from 762 to 914.4 mm.72  
Existing pipeline cost estimates vary greatly and may be inaccurate due to the 
increase in pipeline price over time. Using the CEE estimated pipeline prices from 2006 
is problematic because steel prices vary, the demand for pipeline changes, the 
construction, labor, and land acquisition costs are location dependent, and a number of 
other factors, including the price of natural gas, play a role in the unit price. Recent 
pipeline projects are analyzed below to produce an estimate of pipeline costs that are used 
in this analysis, rather than using the Oxford or CEE estimates. 	  
4.3.3 Recent Onshore and Offshore EU Pipeline Projects 
EU Commission price information and media reports regarding the construction 
of new pipeline projects has been analyzed and is used to estimate future projects.  The 
OPAL, NEL and GIPL pipelines are used to estimate onshore pipeline costs and the Nord 
Stream, Greenstream, and Langeled pipelines are used to estimate offshore prices. 
The OPAL and NEL pipelines have larger capacities than the 700 mm pipelines 
previously referenced, but their price per km-mm is on the same order as the CEE price 
estimates at US$1216/km-mm and US$1278/km-mm respectively.73 Both OPAL and 
NEL are distribution pipelines for the Nord Stream. OPAL runs through Germany toward 
Czechia and NEL runs through Hamburg toward the Netherlands. A planned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 ICF International, “Natural Gas Pipeline and Storage Infrastructure Projections through 2030,” October 
20, 2009, http://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=10509. 
73 Vladimir Socor, “Moscow and European Commission Negotiates Over OPAL Gas Pipeline,” Eurasia 
Daily Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 20, The Jamestown Foundation, January 31, 2014, 
https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-and-european-commission-negotiate-over-opal-gas-pipeline/. 
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interconnector project between Lithuania and Poland, the Gas Interconnector Poland-
Lithuania (GIPL), is a 700 mm pipeline estimated to cost US$1194/km-mm. The average 
of the OPAL, NEL, and GIPL pipelines is used as the middle onshore price estimate. 
The European Commission has passed legislation that regulates the manner by 
which pipelines can be constructed with the goal of further integration of countries into 
the larger natural gas transmission system. Directive 2009/73/EC of the European 
Parliament introduced common rules for transmission, distribution, supply, and storage of 
natural gas in order to increase transparency in the internal EU market.74 Within this 
regulation member states are expected to monitor security of supply, and work toward 
integration of national markets into regional markets and eventually a EU-wide internal 
market.75 In 2017, the European Commission amended the 2009 Gas Directive to extend 
EU regulations to include pipelines from non-EU countries entering the EU. 76 In the 
years since 2009, EU member states have moved toward EU internal market integration, 
standardization of rules for ownership of member state transmission, third party non-
discriminatory access to storage and pipeline infrastructure, and directional functionality 
of pipelines. Therefore, it is assumed that the regulation of natural gas infrastructure will 
not have different effects on pipeline CAPEX for different EU member states, though 
inconsistencies between EU member state regulations do exist.. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 EUR-Lex Access to European Law, “Internal Gas Market,” Directive 2009/73/EC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:en0017&from=EN. 
75 Ibid. 
76“Common rules for gas pipelines entering the EU internal market,” European Parliament, January 23, 
2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)614673. 
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Pipeline	   Length	  (km)	   Diameter	  (mm)	   Cost	  (millions	  $)	   $/km-­‐mm	   Capacity	  (bcm/yr)	  OPAL	   470	   1400	   1300	   1216	   35	  NEL	  	   440	   1422	   1300	   1278	   20	  GIPL	  (planned)	   534	   700	   558	   1194	   3.4	  
Table 8: Recent European Onshore Interconnector Projects77 
Offshore pipelines generally have higher capital costs than onshore pipelines, and 
thus it makes less sense to build them at high capacities. The Nord Stream pipeline, 
delivers natural gas from Russia to Germany to be distributed to central and western 
European states. It has a capacity of 55 bcm/yr  and cost US$2622/km-mm to build.78 The 
Green Stream pipeline which connects western Libya to Sicily, started operating in 2004, 
and had a cost of US$14,244/km-mm. The high price per km-mm is due to its low 
capacity, of only 11 bcm/yr. Additionally, there is widespread speculation of corruption 
on the Greenstream project.79 The Langeled pipeline connects Norwegian natural gas to 
the United Kingdom. This project actually came in below budget at US$1305/km-mm.80 
The Nord Stream and Langeled projects’ $/km-mm are used to price any offshore 
pipeline portions in the case studies. The Greenstream appears to be an outlier and  is 
ignored. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Socor, “Moscow and European Commission Negotiates Over OPAL Gas Pipeline.”  
“Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania,” Hydrocarbons Technology, accessed May 2, 2018, 
https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/gas-interconnection-polandlithuania/ 
78 “Nord Stream by the Numbers Fact Sheet,” Nord Stream, November 2013, https://www.nord-
stream.com/.../nord-stream-by-the-numbers_177_20131128.pdf. 
79“The GreenStream Pipeline,” ENI, accessed November 3, 2017, 
http://www.greenstreambv.com/en/pages/home.shtml . 
Evarist Bartolo, “When greed killed a gas pipeline,” MaltaToday, February 17, 2013, 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/comment/blogs/1178/when-greed-killed-a-gas-pipeline#.WfzM3BIrJsY. 
80 “Gas pipeline to begin operations,” BBC News, September 30, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5394214.stm. 
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Pipeline	   Length	  (km)	   Diameter	  (mm)	   Cost	  (millions	  $)	   $/km-­‐mm	   Capacity	  (bcm/yr)	  Nord	  Stream	  (2	  lines)	   1224	   2306	   7400	   2622	   55	  Greenstream	   520	   812.8	   6020	   14243	   11	  Langeled	   1166	   1117.6	   1700	   1305	   25.5	  
Table 9: Recent European Offshore Pipeline Projects 
4.3.4 Turkmenistan Pipelines  
Two recent onshore natural gas pipelines outside of Europe have also been 
examined to shed light on the capital expenditures for onshore pipelines. The 
Turkmenistan-China or the Central Asia-China Pipeline has three lines: A and B with a 
capacity of 15 bcm/yr each and C with a capacity of 25 bcm/yr, for a total of 55 bcm/yr.81 
The initial investment of $7.3B (completed in 2010) covered Lines A and B. The data in 
the table below only includes this initial project.82 This pipeline transports natural gas 
from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan for use in China and travels a total of 
1833km. The East-West pipeline connects East Turkmenistan to the Caspian Sea for 
export. It travels 773 km and has a capacity of 30 bcm/yr.83 Construction of both 
pipelines began in 2007, but a 2009 explosion in the Central Asia-Tsentr-4 pipeline, 
which connected Turkmenistan to Russia delayed construction. Both Turkmenistan and 
Russia blamed each other, and the resulting disagreement led to significant delays 
because Russian contractors were leading the construction of the East-West pipeline. 
Turkmenistan believed that Russia feared losing its market power in Europe with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Bruce Pannier, “The End of The (Gas Pipe-) Line for Turkmenistan,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 
March 6, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-gas-pipeline-china-berdymukhammedov-iran-
russia/28353522.html. 
82 “Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China,” Hydrocarbons Technology, June 28, 2010, 
https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/features/feature88872/. 
83 Robert M. Butler, “Turkmenistan pipeline from east to west to be completed this year,” February 23, 
2015, Eurasian Security.com, http://www.eurasiansecurity.com/energy-geopolitics/turkmenistan-pipeline-
completing-east-west/. 
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inclusion of Turkmen supply, and Russia blamed Turkmen infrastructure.84 The cost of 
lines A and B of the Turkmenistan-China pipeline is US$933/km-mm and the cost of the 
East-West pipeline is US$2274/km-mm.  
Both of these projects help in the estimation of the construction costs of the 
pipelines for the case study countries, but in different ways. The Turkmenistan-China 
pipeline is an example of a large-scale onshore project that has taken advantage of 
economies of scale resulting in a low price per km-mm. The project was led by Chinese 
construction firms and Chinese labor was employed to build the pipeline, as has been the 
case for recent Turkmen natural gas fields and pipeline projects.85 Therefore, it may not 
serve as a great comparable to a European-built pipeline, but can serve as a low-end 
estimate. The Central Asia-Tsentr-4 pipeline serves as a cautionary tale, because there is 
always risk in any large-scale infrastructure project of potential for sabotage from another 
state actor. There is no definitive answer as to why the pipeline exploded, but any action 
by European states to reduce Russia’s coercive power could result in an aggressive 
response, increasing CAPEX. 
Interestingly, the Turkmenistan-China and East-West pipelines have the same 
capacity, 30 bcm/yr, but construction prices per km-mm are markedly different. Both 
pipelines have a similar desert geographic setting within Turkmenistan, and the 
Turkmenistan-China pipeline route covers similar topography through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan but a rise in elevation entering China via the Tien Shan mountain range 
would suggest a higher price per km-mm due to construction in a less accessible high 
elevation area. The East-West pipeline was initially being built by Gazprom subsidiary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Catherine Putz, “Turkmenistan Completes East-West Pipeline: What’s Next,” The Diplomat, December 
29, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/turkmenistan-completes-east-west-pipeline-whats-next/. 
85 Bruce Pannier, “What Does China’s One Belt, One Road Project Mean for Central Asia?,” Gandhara, 
November 12, 2016, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html . 
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Zarubezhneftegaz, but then after the pipeline explosion, construction was delayed and 
Turkmenistan opted to self-finance the project and use domestic contractor, 
Turkmennebitgaz. The delay likely played a role in the higher construction cost.86 The 
two Turkmen pipelines can serve as low and high-end estimates for onshore natural gas 
pipelines for this analysis. The table below gives a summary of the technical information 
and prices of these pipelines. The high-end cost estimate is required because sabotage of 
pipeline construction is a possibility in light of reducing the coercive power of Russia.  	  
Pipeline	   length	  (km)	   diameter	  (mm)	   Cost	  (millions	  $)	   $/km-­‐mm	   Capacity	  (bcm/yr)	  Turkmenistan-­‐China(A	  and	  B)	  3666	   2134	   7300	   933	   30	  Turkmenistan	  East-­‐West	   773	   1422	   2500	   2274	   30	  	  
Table 10: Recent Non-European Onshore Pipeline Projects 
The pipeline projects that have been analyzed are used to estimate the capital 
costs for new infrastructure projects in Bulgaria and Finland. For purposes of this 
analysis the Turkmenistan pipelines are used to bracket high-end and low-end estimations 
for onshore pipeline projects, at prices US$933/km-mm and US$2274/km-mm 
respectively. The middle estimate for onshore pipelines is US$1229/km-mm, which is the 
average of the European onshore pipelines which were examined. Estimates of offshore 
pipelines will employ the Nord Stream and Langeled pipelines for high-end and low-end 
estimates at US$2622/km-mm and $1305/km-mm. It will also be assumed that these 
prices include the compression facilities required for a new build pipeline as the prices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Vladimir Socor, “Turkmenistan Starts Construction of East-West Pipeline,” The Jamestown Foundation, 
June 8, 2010,  https://jamestown.org/program/turkmenistan-starts-construction-of-east-west-pipeline/. 
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used to determine these $/km-mm amounts were derived from the reported prices for the 
entire infrastructure project, including compression. 
4.4 PIPELINE OPERATIONAL COSTS, COMPRESSION COSTS, AND REVERSE FLOW 
CAPACITY 
4.4.1 Compression 
The compression of natural gas for transportation is an operating expense of any 
pipeline. Compressors create a pressure differential moving the gas from high pressure to 
low pressure. Friction within the pipeline slows the movement of the gas, thus 
compressors are required roughly every 50-100 miles or 83-166 km.87 Bi-directional 
compression offers greater flexibility in transportation and protection against coercive 
vulnerability. Within this analysis the capital expenditure cost for compression are 
assumed to be embedded with the capital cost for pipeline construction. Pipeline 
compression is usually automated using a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system, thus labor costs are considered to be negligible. The overall operating 
costs for pipelines, including the costs for compression are assumed to be US$3.52 M per 
bcm/yr based upon analysis by Angsar Brauer for “Gas for Energy.88 The 2-3% “rule of 
thumb” cost for fuel for compression is often cited but without justification other than 
“from industry sources,” but Brauer’s analysis is within the same order of magnitude, 
though the 2-3% rule would vary depending on the cost of natural gas, as it would in 
Brauer’s analysis. Brauer included energy for compression, maintenance, personnel, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Michelle Foss, “Global/US LNG Update,” SABIT LNG Delegation, Center for Energy Economics, 
Bureau of Economic Geology, August 25, 2006, 
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88 Angsar Brauner, “techno-economic optimization of large natural gas systems, “Gas for Energy, Gas 
Grids, Uniper Global Commodities SE, Issue 4, 2016, https://www.gas-for-
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general administration, and insurance, which amounts to €3/1000m3/100km or US$3.52 
M per bcm/yr.89 	   	  
4.4.2 Transit Fees 
Russia is charged US$2.19 per 1000 m3 per 100 km traveled through the Nord 
Stream pipeline. 90 This fee is used to estimate transit costs when natural gas is transited 
on territory of countries not consuming the gas.  
4.4.3 Reverse Flow Capacity Costs 
There are a number of projects under the European Energy Programme (EEPR) 
that were approved in response to the 2009 crisis in order to provide increased energy 
security for eastern, central, and southeastern European states by providing these 
countries with access to supplies of natural gas from western Europe by reversing the 
flow of existing pipelines. The reported costs for these projects are used to estimate 
future reverse flow projects that could be utilized by Bulgaria and Finland. It is the policy 
of the EEPR that, since 2009, when increased pipeline capacity is added to the European 
natural gas grid, reverse flow capability is also included. Therefore, it is difficult to 
determine the cost of simply reversing flow, as reversing flow is built into the cost for 
numerous large projects.  
Three projects that were aimed solely at reversing flow are used to estimate this 
cost.91 The Baumgartner reverse flow project allows the WAG pipeline, which runs from 
the Germany-Austria border toward Slovakia and Hungary’s HAG pipeline, to reverse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid. 
90 “Nord Stream 2 and Ukraine: Costs Should Decide: Analytic Report,” National Energy Security Fund, 
Moscow, November 2016, file:///Users/rb36467/Documents/nord-stream2final.pdf. 
91 “EEPR gas projects,” EU Commission, October 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/gas-
interconnections-and-reverse-flow/gas-eepr-summary_en.pdf. 
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flow at the Baumgartner station.92  The upgrade of the Uberackern Export Facility 
increased the overall capacity of reverse flow between Austria and Germany and 
connected these pipelines to gas storage in West Austria.93 A third project sought to 
optimize the function of Hungarian natural gas transmission by establishing reverse flow 
at five of the country’s transmission control nodes.94 The total price of the project has 
been divided by five to reflect the cost of each individual reverse flow project. Other 
completed projects that included building additional pipelines, adding capacity to existing 
pipelines, and /or storage while also reversing flow were examined but for purposes of 
this analysis the three projects mentioned above are used to estimate the cost of reversing 
flow. The purpose of reversing flow and pricing for these reverse flow projects is shown 
below. The estimate of US$2M-5 M is used to estimate any reverse flow required for 
case study states Bulgaria and Finland. 	  	   Reverse	  Flow	  Station	   cost	  (millions	  $)	   Allows	  for	  reverse	  flow	  interconnection	  Baumgarten	   5.37844	   Austria-­‐Hungary	  Uberackern	   2.714	   Germany-­‐Austria	  Hungary	  domestic	  capacity	  and	  reverse	  flow	  (5	  nodes)	   19.1868	   Hungary-­‐Romania-­‐SE	  Europe	  Hungary	  project	  single	  node	  estimate	   3.83736	   Hungary-­‐Romania-­‐SE	  Europe	  	  
Table 11: EU Commission EEPR Reverse Flow Projects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 “Gas Interconnection: Austria No.1 – reverse flow (RF AT-01), EEPR gas projects, EU Commission, 
October 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/gas-interconnections-and-reverse-flow/reverse-
flow-at-01_en.pdf. 
93 “Gas Interconnection: Austria No.3 – reverse flow (RF AT-03), EEPR gas projects, EU Commission, 
October 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/gas-interconnections-and-reverse-flow/reverse-
flow-at-03_en.pdf. 
94 “Gas Interconnection: Hungary – reverse flow (RF HU), EEPR gas projects, EU Commission, October 
2013, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/gas-interconnections-and-reverse-flow/reverse-flow-
hu_en.pdf. 
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4.5 NATURAL GAS STORAGE 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Natural gas storage serves many purposes and is an essential component for 
reducing eastern European reliance on Russian natural gas. In a functioning natural gas 
market, storage serves to smooth fluctuations in supply and demand. For example, when 
the contracted amount of gas delivered is larger than the current demand of a consumer, 
the gas can be stored for use at a later date. The storage facilities can also be used 
seasonally. Gas can be purchased in the summer when prices are typically lower and then 
stored for use in the higher demand, and thus usually higher price, winter. Natural gas 
storage can also be used strategically to ensure short run energy security.  
For example, in the 2009 Russia-Ukraine debt dispute, Romania was able to 
largely maintain its level of natural gas consumption due to its natural gas storage facility 
and robust domestic production. The country has eight UGS facilities with a total 
capacity of 3 bcm. The country was able to increase domestic natural gas production 
60%, leaving only a 34% shortfall in its natural gas consumption, though its fertilizer 
plant was shut down.95 Bulgaria, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, and Moldova saw a 100% 
shortfall in natural gas, as they do not have much domestic production or storage. 
Bulgaria only had storage to cover 2 to 3 days of winter consumption, Serbia could only 
cover one day, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia did not have any natural gas 
storage.96  If a country has substantial natural gas storage capacity, then it cannot be 
coerced in the short run via threats of a supply cut-off. In the longer run natural gas 
supplies can be diverted if the appropriate LNG import or pipeline capacity is available, 
or even transported via truck or “virtual pipeline” if required although this is costly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Kovacevic, “The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in South Eastern Europe.”  
96 Ibid. 
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In the United States, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was built in response 
to the 1973 to 1974 oil embargo. It holds 38 days’ worth of US consumption or 71 days 
of imports at 2013 levels. But the globalized nature of oil imports make it impossible for 
any actor to fully blockade oil imports to any country within the assistance of U.S. 
maritime forces. 97 Storage at this level is no longer necessary due to the globalized oil 
market and the true power in terms of oil coercion is actually the United States due to its 
maritime presence. The hysteria created by the 1973 oil embargo led many U.S. 
policymakers to be concerned regarding an embargo of supplies to reduce military 
capability or an “oil weapon,” but this threat is diminished due to the robust number of 
suppliers for oil.98  
Natural gas storage can be used as a way to protect against a “gas weapon” that 
can be employed to cause financial harm to a target country which has limited, or 
potentially, no other source of natural gas other than from a single source country via 
pipeline. 
4.5.2 Types of Storage and Capital Costs 
There are three types of underground natural gas storage: salt caverns, depleted 
oil and gas reservoirs, and aquifers. A salt cavern typically must be filled with 20-30% 
base gas and the rest is working gas. Base gas is the required amount to maintain optimal 
pressure for the working gas to be extracted. The working gas can be recycled 10 to 12 
times per year in a salt cavern. Depleted oil/gas reservoirs are the most common gas 
storage facilities and have a working gas capacity of 50%. Aquifer storage usually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Eugene Gholz, “Managing US Energy Security,” in Our Foreign Policy Choices: Rethinking America’s 
Global Role, ed. Christopher Preble et al, CATO Institute Press 2016.  
98 Llewelyn Hughes and Austin Long, “Is there an Oil Weapon? Security Implications of Changes in the 
Structure of the international Oil Market,” International Security, MIT Press, Vol.39, issue 3, Winter 
2014/2015, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00188. 
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requires 50 to 80% base gas.99 Storage cost estimates depend on a number of variables, 
including labor costs, facility accessibility, and notably the actual geologic endowment of 
the country. For example, countries that have previously produced natural gas can use 
depleted fields as natural gas storage, but without this historic production, depleted field 
storage is not an option. If a suitable location exists to construct an UGS, the main capital 
costs include land acquisition, wells and above ground treatment facilities, compressors, 
connecting pipelines, and purchase of cushion gas.100 Salt caverns require an additional 
cost for cavern construction, which requires dissolution and brine disposal. Seismic 
analysis, control systems planning, and land-use/environmental permitting also add to 
UGS CAPEX.101 The capital cost price estimates below are based upon historic cost 
trends for projects from 1997 to 2007 and will serve as a guide for pricing potential 
projects in case study countries. 
 
 Field	  Type	   expansion	  cost	  (millions	  $/bcm)	   new	  facility	  cost	  (millions	  $/bcm)	  	  Salt	   236.6	   296.6	  Depleted	   173.0	   233.0	  Aquifer	   384.9	   480.2	  
Table 12: Underground Storage Cost Estimates102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Current State of and Issues Concerning Underground Gas 
Storage,” Staff report, September 30, 2004, https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20041020081349-
final-gs-report.pdf. 
100 Chris Le Fevre, “Gas Storage in Great Britain,” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 2013, 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/gas-storage-in-great-britain/. 
101 Ibid. 
102 ICF International, “Natural Gas Pipeline and Storage Infrastructure Projections Through 2030,” 
October 20, 2009, http://www.ingaa.org/cms/31/7306/7828.aspx. 
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4.5.3 Examples of EU Storage Expansion 
The UGS strategies of Latvia and Hungary are discussed to test the pricing 
assumptions put forth by ICF. Additionally, the projected cost of expansion of Serbian 
natural gas capabilities are examined. Hungary moved toward increased storage to not 
only combat the potential for supply disruptions, but to position itself as a regional supply 
hub. During the 2009 disruption, Hungary was able to use its storage to provide domestic 
energy services, and also to profit by supplying its neighbors with gas. Latvia’s 
expansion of its underground storage facility allowed the Baltic states to have a natural 
gas transmission grid with the potential to function independently of Russia.  
Hungary currently has underground natural gas storage totaling 7 bcm, which is 
more than half of its 9 bcm yearly demand.103 After being left without natural gas imports  
for four days in 2006, the Hungarian government moved to obtain strategic natural gas 
storage to defend against future disruptions.104 A depleted gas reservoir at Szóreg was 
chosen, which at the time was owned by the Hungarian oil and gas company MOL. The 
cost of converting the reservoir to 1.9 bcm of storage reportedly cost HUF 150 B, or $598 
M at today’s exchange rate.105 The reported dollar cost in 2009 was US$815.7 M. 106 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103Elias Langvad, “Hungary and Czech Republic’s Approach to Gas Security,” Institute for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2017-18, kki.hu/assets/upload/08_KKI-Studies_HUN-
CZE_Langvad_20171017_00000002.pdf. 
“The role of gas storage in the internal market and in ensuring security of supply,” European Commission, 
Directorate General for Energy, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/.../REPORT-
Gas%20Storage-20150728.pdf. 
International Energy Agency, “IEA Gas Trade Flows, in Mcm, Country information,” 
https://www.iea.org/gtf/#. 
104  Langvad, “Hungary and Czech Republic’s Approach to Gas Security.” 
105 Reuters Staff, “Hungary’s MOL brings emergency gas storage online,” Reuters, October 1, 2009, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/hungary-gas/hungarys-mol-brings-emergency-gas-storage-online-
idUSL159567920091001. 
106 Ibid. 
 1 HUF = 0.0032 Euros, US$1=0.81 Euros (March 27, 2018)_ 
The cost of the expansion of this facility is difficult to gauge as the exchange rate used by the 2009 Reuters 
article indicated a cost of US$815.7M or HUF 150B, but at today’s rate the dollar cost is substantially less. 
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ICF estimation for a new storage facility at a depleted gas field would be US$442.7 M. 
MOL was later acquired by E.ON who expanded the Zsana UGS by 600 Mcm at a 
reported cost of US$161 M.107 Using the ICF estimates, the expansion should have cost 
US$104 M, which is lower than the reported cost, but currency fluctuations may make 
the analysis incorrect. The strategy of Hungary, a country without coastal access, serves 
as an example for other land-locked states, such as Serbia, to increase energy security by 
enhancing its ability to be a transport hub with storage and natural gas transmission 
capacity. 
Latvia has expressed its intent to  increase the capabilities of its natural gas 
storage potential. It hopes to increase its working gas storage capability from 2.3 to 2.8 
bcm by 2025 at an estimated cost of US$444 M.108 This estimate seems high in 
comparison to what ICF would predict at US$192M, but the infrastructure project also 
includes adding additional send-out capacity, the addition of compressor units, 
replacement of current compressor units, pipeline infrastructure and the overall 
modernization of a facility built in 1968.109 The estimate of solely the upgrade of the 
storage working gas storage capacity is estimated at US$284 M, which is more in line 
with the ICF estimation for expanded aquifer storage.110 
Serbia intends to increase its Banatski Dvor facility from 450 Mcm to 1 bcm at an 
estimated  cost of US$82 M.111 Banatski Dvor is a depleted gas field, and if the ICF 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Reuters Staff, “E.ON to expand gas storage capacity in Hungary,” Reuters, September 17, 2007, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/hungary-gas/e-on-to-expand-gas-storage-capacity-in-hungary-
idUKL1744264120070917. 
Mcm = million cubic meters 
108 “Modernization and enhancement of Incukalns Underground Gas Storage: Business Plan,” Latvijas 
Gaze, Riga, 2014, http://www.lg.lv/uploads/filedir/File/IPGK/ES_projekts/Business_plan.pdf. 
109 Reuters Staff, “Latvia plans to boost gas storage capacity to 2.8b bcm by 2025,” Reuters, October 3, 
2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/latvia-gas/latvia-plans-to-boost-gas-storage-capacity-to-2-8-bcm-by-
2025-idUSL6N0RY2TE20141003. 
110 “Modernization of Incukalns Underground Gas Storage: Business Plan.” 
111 “Serbia to nearly double underground storage capacity,” Reuters, October 1, 2015, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL5N1213KK20151001. 
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estimate for expansion cost of using a depleted field, the project should cost US$81 M. 
Serbia is connected to Russian supply via Ukraine and Hungary, and is a land-locked 
country, but with additional storage and pipeline interconnections, Serbia could follow 
Hungary’s strategy and become a transport hub.  
4.5.4 Natural Gas Storage Operating Expense 
Natural gas storage also involves the cost of injecting and removing the natural 
gas from the storage facility. In order to inject gas into a facility, it must be treated and 
compressed, which requires fuel. Natalie Hinchey of Rice University reports that natural 
gas contracts typically charge 2% of the injected gas volume to cover fuel costs. When 
extracting natural gas from storage, water absorbed during storage must be removed, and 
compression may be required for pipeline injection. Hinchey’s study estimated a 
“baseline” injection and withdrawal cost of US$0.01/MMbtu or US$365/Mcm.112 She 
notes that this price is stable until capacity reaches 90%, when price can increase to 
US$0.03/MMbtu at 99% capacity.113 This analysis will employ the baseline injection and 
withdrawal cost of US$365/Mcm. 
Overall, the costs of storage are estimated using the ICF data. These estimations 
have different prices depending on if the project is an expansion of an existing storage 
facility or if a new facility is being built. Additionally, the type of geologic formation 
affects the price estimate and is taken into account for case study countries. The 
estimated prices of current European infrastructure projects are in line with the ICF data, 
thus assisting in the justification for using the ICF data. The injection and extraction 
operating costs are estimated using the Hinchey assumptions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Natalie Hinchey, “Estimating Natural Gas Salt Cavern Storage Costs, Rice University, Center for 
Energy Studies, 2017, 
http://www.usaee.org/usaee2017/submissions/OnlineProceedings/Nathalie_Hinchey_Gas_Storage_Model_
USAEE_Houston_Student_Paper.pdf. 
113 Ibid. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
The pricing assumption put forth in this chapter are used to estimate the costs 
associated with reducing the coercive vulnerability to natural gas disruption in case study 
countries, Bulgaria and Finland. Both capital costs and operating costs are quantified in 
order to determine the best course of action. Relevant academic literature was consulted 
as an initial guide to pricing, but actual infrastructure project costs reporting in 
government documents and journalistic sources proved to be a more reliable source for 
cost estimation. Four scenarios for each case study country have capital and operating 
costs estimated using the cost assumptions provided in this chapter. It is assumed that the 
useful life of natural gas infrastructure is 30 years, and the operating costs are estimated 
on a 30 year-time scale and discounted to today’s dollars’ present value, or present cost 
of each project. A 10% discount rate is used as it is the industry standard for comparing 
large projects, which considers the average weighted cost of capital and a risk premium. 
The additional costs and benefits of each project are discussed in order to determine best 
case scenarios for each case study country moving forward. A summary of the pricing 
assumptions is listed below and is used as a guide for the case study price analysis. 	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4.7 PRICE ASSUMPTIONS SUMMARY 
 
Coastal	  Regasification	  Facility	  CAPEX	  FSRU	  170	  kcm	  Storage	  Capacity…………………………………….US$236-­‐280	  M	  Onshore	  Interface/Infrastructure…………………………….........US$30	  M	  Construction	  of	  Jetty	  and	  Piping……………………………............US$80	  M	  	  
Coastal	  Regasification	  Facility	  OPEX	  Operations	  &	  Maintenance…………………………………………….2.5%	  of	  CAPEX/yr	  LNG	  Surcharge…………………………………………………..................US$162	  -­‐216	  M/bcm	  Lease	  Surcharge………………………………………………...................US$189,000/day	  	  
Pipeline	  CAPEX	  Onshore	  High	  Estimate	  East-­‐West	  Turkmenistan……………US$2274/km-­‐mm	  Onshore	  Middle	  Estimate	  EU	  Project	  Average…………………US$1229/km-­‐mm	  Onshore	  Low	  Estimate	  Turkmenistan-­‐China…………………...US$933/km-­‐mm	  Offshore	  High	  Estimate	  Nord	  Stream………………………….......US$2622/km-­‐mm	  Offshore	  Low	  Estimate	  Langeled…………………………………….US$1305/km-­‐mm	  Addition	  of	  Bidirectional	  Compression……………………………US$2-­‐5	  M	  per	  facility	  	  
Pipeline	  OPEX	  Compression	  cost…………………………………………………………..US$3.52	  M	  per	  bcm/yr	  Transit	  fee………………....…………………………………………………..US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km	  	  
Underground	  Gas	  Storage	  CAPEX	  Salt	  Expansion………………………………………………………………US$236.6	  M/bcm	  Salt	  New	  Facility……………………………………………………………US$296.6	  M/bcm	  Depleted	  Expansion………………………………………………………US$173.0	  M/bcm	  Depleted	  New	  Facility……………………………………………………US$233.0	  M/bcm	  Aquifer	  Expansion…………………………………………………………US$384.9	  M/bcm	  Aquifer	  New	  Facility……………………………………………………...US$480.2	  M/bcm	  	  
Underground	  Storage	  OPEX	  Injection/Withdrawal	  Cost……………………………………………US$365/Mcm	  	  
Discount	  Rate……………………………………………………………...10%	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Chapter 5: Case Study–Finland 
5.1 BACKGROUND/FINLAND’S ENERGY MIX 
Finland is selected as a case study because it imports 100% of its natural gas from 
Russia, and has no other current import option indicating a high level of import 
dependence. Finland’s economy is about one-fourth the size of Russia’s and Finland’s 
natural imports only make up 1.2% of Gazprom’s total exports showing asymmetric 
dependence. Though the country is diversified in terms of fuel type for energy 
production, it does not have a diverse set of trade partners for fossil fuel resources, with 
the large majority of its fossil fuel resources coming from Russia. In 2016, biofuels led 
with 26% of primary energy production, followed by oil with 23%, nuclear with 18%, 
coal with 9%, and natural gas with 6%.114 Overall, Finland relies on Russia for a large 
portion of its energy consumption: 88% of oil, 64% of coal, and 100% of Finland’s 
natural gas consumption originate in Russia. 115  Coal and oil can be replaced via 
international markets, but without an additional option for importing natural gas, a 
disruption would present significant adjustment costs due to fuel switching and decreased 
industrial production. 
A disruption of natural gas imports will harm Finnish industrial production, the 
provision of heating services, and electrical production. Only about 2.5% of natural gas 
consumption is used directly by households for cooking or heating, much lower than the 
EU average of 20%. In all, 47.9% of Finland’s natural gas consumption is used for 
industrial processes, 22% for electrical production, and the remaining 27.4% for district 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Statistics Finland, “Energy Supply and Consumption,” 2016, 4th Quarter, March 23, 2017, Helsinki, 
tilastokeskus.fi/til/ehk/2016/04/ehk_2016_04_2017-03-23_en.pdf. 
115 IEA, “Finland–Energy System Overview,” International Energy Agency, 
https://www.iea.org/media/countries/Finland.pdf. 
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heating.116 The use of combined heat and power (CHP) connects the three large users of 
natural gas in that a reduction in fuel for one effects all three. For example, waste heat 
from electrical production is used for industrial purposes and for district heating. In the 
event of a natural gas disruption, those reliant on district heating will switch to electrical 
heating, leading to increased demand for gas for electricity production, leaving industry 
to rely on onsite storage or a reduction in production. A disruption of  natural gas supply 
will affect the three large consumers of natural gas because of their interconnected 
processes, and represents a potential high cost to the Finnish economy 
Finland’s options for natural gas imports are limited by geography, and it is  
supplied solely by a twin pipeline system originating in Russia. The natural gas 
infrastructure is located in the more densely populated southern portion of the country. 
Finland borders both Russia and Norway, which are large natural gas producers, and 
Sweden, which has no gas production and only 0.8 bcm/yr consumption, supplied via the 
south of the country through the Denmark hub. Both Norwegian supply sources and the 
Denmark hub are a long distance from Finnish demand, and no supply pipeline exists. 
Finland is not connected to the EU internal natural gas transmission system, and its only 
current natural gas import option is Russia. 
Self-sufficiency strategies are lacking for Finland in that it does not have any 
natural gas production currently, and none historically. The lack of fossil fuel production 
history leaves no depleted fields in Finland to be used as storage, and the country also 
does not have suitable geology for an aquifer type storage facility. Finnish gas plants and 
any industrial users that consume over 15 Mcm per year of natural gas are required to 
hold alternative fuel stocks equaling 3 months’ demand by the 1994 Act on Compulsory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Finnish Gas Association, “Statistics,” Suomen Kaasuyhdistys, accessed April 22, 2018, 
http://www.kaasuyhdistys.fi/sisalto/statistics. 
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Stockholding of Imported Fuels.117 A tax on natural gas consumption is used to maintain 
these emergency stocks.118  The backup fuel requirements of Finland are considered 
sufficient for Finland to defend against short term disruption, but in order to substitute 
Russian supply other options must be investigated. 
Overall, Finland has been on a general downward trend in terms of natural gas 
consumption, with a peak natural gas demand of 4.1 bcm/yr in 2003, down to 2.1 bcm/yr 
in 2016.119 Natural gas consumption will likely increase as Finland acts to reduce carbon 
emissions by phasing out coal-based energy production. Coal is set to be replaced by 
2030 due to a carbon tax and the commissioning of two nuclear power plants.120  
 
 
Figure 5: Finland–Natural Gas Consumption 
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Until recently, Finland planned to replace coal with nuclear power production, but 
delays and cost overruns have soured Finnish public opinion for nuclear. The Olkiluoto 3 
facility is now coming online in 2018 but was eight years past the initial projected date 
and cost more than three times the initial bid.121 The cost overages involved with the 
Olkiluoto 3 facility spurred the Finnish government to cancel plans for a fourth facility at 
Olkiluoto. Therefore, if Finland intends to reduce carbon emissions by phasing out coal 
for baseload power production, then natural gas may be an attractive fuel moving forward  
because other baseload power sources may not be feasible given the current 
circumstances. Finland’s hydroelectric capacity is considered to have been fully 
exploited, and hydropower is variable depending on the yearly precipitation.122 Biofuels 
have grown in prominence due to the vast uninhabited northern territory of Finland, but 
deforestation concerns have slowed the growth of this fuel source.123  EU Regulation to 
reduce carbon emissions would force  Finland to purchase carbon credits if it were to 
increase its biofuel production. And lastly, a movement toward electrification of transport 
will increase the growth of electricity consumption and thus the need for primary energy 
other than oil. Overall the case for natural gas taking a larger role in Finland’s primary 
energy is strong, creating the need to improve the security of natural gas imports. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Andrew Ward, “Nuclear plant nears completion after huge delays,” Financial Times, May 17, 2017, 
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122 “World Energy Resources 2016,” Finland-Hydropower, World Energy Council, 
https://www.worldenergy.org/data/resources/country/finland/hydropower/. 
123 Dan Naumov, “Finland’s dreams of biodiesel future are getting crushed,” Business Insider: Nordic, July 
27, 2017, http://nordic.businessinsider.com/finlands-biodiesel-dreams-are-getting-crushed-2017-7/. 
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5.2 STRATEGIES TO REDUCE NATURAL GAS COERCIVE VULNERABILITY 
The infrastructure plans that are modeled for Finland represent four different 
strategies to reduce the potential for coercive vulnerability of natural gas supplies. Prices 
are estimated in both the short and long term, and additionally any potential geopolitical 
costs or concerns of each plan are discussed.  
These strategies are evaluated with Kelanic’s framework of anticipatory 
strategies. Finland lacks self sufficiency strategies in that it does not have current or 
historical natural gas production. Direct control strategies, that would entail conquest of 
natural gas producing countries are not be considered. Indirect control, involves securing 
supply from other sources and forming a strategic alliance to endure supplies. The 
strategies discussed are indirect control strategies, as there is some dependence on second 
party suppliers, though an LNG strategy is dependent on the functioning of the global 
market rather than one fixed supplier.  
5.2.1 Helsinki-Hammerfest Pipeline 
The first plan intends to connect the demand center of southern Finland via a 
pipeline extending North to Norway’s Melkøya natural gas facility, which connects to the 
offshore Shøhvit offshore natural gas field. Melkøya has a production capacity of 5.9 
bcm/yr.124 Within Kelanic’s framework, this strategy represents indirect control where 
Finland is creating a strategic partnership with Norway to reduce vulnerability to Russia. 
Both countries are part of the Nordic Council and NATO, and therefore it can be assumed 
that a long-term supply contract would take the place of an additional treaty between 
countries regarding gas supply. Czechia used a similar strategy with Norway in the 1990s 
to diversify its supply from Russia, and was not largely affected by the 2006, 2009, and 
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2014 natural gas disputes.125 Norway has proved to be reliable gas supply partner for 
number of European countries. 
 
Helsinki-­‐Hammerfest	  Pipeline	  
	  consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
pipeline	  length	  (km)	   1480	  
pipeline	  length	  in	  Norway	  (km)	   350	  
Table 13: Helsinki-Hammerfest Pipeline Dimensions 
The estimated pipeline length is 1480km with 350km in Norwegian territory. 
Therefore, a transit fee is charged for the portion of the pipeline on Norwegian territory. 
The pipeline will run north toward Jyväskyä and then through the eastern portion of the 
country toward Oula on the northern end of the Gulf of Bothnia. It then will hug the 
border with Sweden until crossing the Norwegian border and proceeding to Kautokeino, 
Alta, and then Hammerfest, where Melkøya is located. The route is based upon existing 
transportation infrastructure allowing for access to construction areas and ease of 
maintenance. The Artic terrain and higher elevation in the northern portion of the 
Scandinavian Mountain range suggest that the onshore high estimate for pipeline price 
would likely be appropriate. Additionally, some offshore pipeline may be required to 
access the Melkøya facility, which is located on an island. This proposed route requires 
further territorial analysis, but for purposes of this thesis, this rough estimate will suffice. 
Onshore high, mid, and low pipeline estimates are quantified and an assumed transit fee 
is charged on the 350km of the pipeline lying in Norwegian territory.  
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Figure 6: Finland/Norway Map126 
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Figure 7: Melkøya LNG127 
Pipeline	  CAPEX	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	   Onshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2274/km-­‐mm)	   2.36	  
	   Onshore	  Middle	  Estimate	  (US$1229/km-­‐mm)	   1.27	  
	   Onshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$933/km-­‐mm)	   0.97	  
	   	   	  
Pipeline	  OPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	  
	   Transit	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   10.2	  
	   Total	   18.95	  
	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  (US$M)	   178.6	  
	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	  	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	   High	  	   2.53	  
	   Middle	   1.55	  
	   Low	   1.14	  
Table 14: Helsinki-Hammerfest Estimated Cost 
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5.2.2 Inkoo LNG 
The second infrastructure plan connects Finland to global LNG slack capacity by 
constructing an LNG import facility, following the route Lithuania took to reduce 
coercive vulnerability. This would fall somewhere between a self-sufficiency and indirect 
control strategy within Kelanic’s framework. LNG import depends on slack LNG export 
capacity and the functioning of a global LNG market, rather that dependence on a single 
supplier such as Norway or Russia. The current pipeline infrastructure only flows east 
from Russia, and it is unlikely that reverse flow would be employed to supply Russia. 
Inkoo has been proposed as a potential site for an LNG import facility, so that location is 
used for this analysis. 
LNG project prices are estimated using two scenarios. The “2.5 scenario” 
represents the construction of a LNG import facility that will replace Russian gas supply, 
without any other supply sources other than LNG. The “0.5 scenario” represents the 
construction of an LNG import facility in concert with other projects. For example, if an 
LNG facility were constructed and Finland were connected to the EU internal 
transmission grid, Finland would have the option to import LNG if needed. An yearly 
import of 0.5 bcm is assumed to represent the operating cost of having the LNG option, 
though not fully replacing supply by LNG.  
 
Inkoo	  LNG	  Facility	  
	  consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
FSRU	  import	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4	  
1-­‐170	  kcm	  storage	  FSRU	   1	  
Table 15: Inkoo LNG Dimensions 	  
 65 
	  	  
Figure 8: Proposed Location of Inkoo LNG128 
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LNG	  CAPEX	   x	   High	  Cost	  ($M)	   Low	  Cost	  ($M)	  
	   1-­‐	  FSRU	  170	  kcm	  storage	   280	   236	  
	   1-­‐Online	  Infrastructure	  	   30	   30	  
	   1-­‐Constructionof	  Jetty/Pipeline	   80	   80	  
	   Total	  LNG	  CAPEX	  	   390	   346	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
LNG	  OPEX	   2.5	  bcm/yr	   High	  Cost	  ($M/yr)	  Low	  Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Operations	  &	  Maintenance	   9.75	   8.65	  
	   LNG	  Surcharge	  (2.5bcm/yr)	   540	   405	  
	   Total	  (2.5bcm/yr)	   549.75	   413.65	  
	   	   High	  Cost	  ($M)	   Low	  Cost	  ($M)	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	   5182.45	   3899.44	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
LNG	  OPEX	   0.5bcm/yr	   High	  Cost	  ($M/yr)	  Low	  Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Operations	  &	  Maintenance	   9.75	   8.65	  
	   LNG	  Surcharge	  (0.5bcm/yr)	   108	   81	  
	   Total	  (0.5bcm/yr)	   117.75	   89.65	  
	   	   High	  Cost	  ($M)	   Low	  Cost	  ($M)	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	   1110.02	   845.12	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	  	   x	   High	  Cost	  ($B)	   Low	  Cost	  ($B)	  
	   2.5	  Scenario	   5.57	   4.25	  
	   0.5	  Scenario	   1.5	   1.19	  
 
Table 16: Inkoo LNG Estimated Cost 
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5.2.3 Balticonnector 
The third strategy is more cooperative in that it connects Baltic regional 
transmission grid. Finland is a member of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan 
(BEMIP), which intends to build a undersea pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia, 
called the Balticonnector. This plan is considered a “project of common interest” within 
the EU Commission, and competing bids have been made intending to be funded by the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).129 This route is shown in Figure 6 by a dotted purple 
line connecting Inkoo, Finland to Paldiski, Estonia. The pipeline would consist of 77 km 
of offshore with 21 km of onshore in Finland and 54 km of onshore pipeline in Estonia. 
The transit cost estimates a transit distance from Latvia’s Incukalns UGS facility of 386 
km.  
 
Balticonnector	  
	  consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
pipeline	  length,	  onshore	  (km)	   75	  
pipeline	  length,	  offshore	  (km)	   77	  
reverse	  flow	  capacity	   1	  
Latvian	  UGS	  to	  Helsinki	  (km)	   386	  
Table 17: Balticonnector Dimensions 
The Baltic grid is currently not connected to the EU internal market, and 
Lithuania’s LNG import capacity (4 bcm/yr) cannot cover the yearly total demand for the 
Baltic states and  Finland (5.1 bcm/yr). If the Balticonnector existed it would force Russia  
to blockade all four countries in order to coerce any one country, giving an added level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Jo Harper, “Alexela Group to Continue LNG import terminal in Paldiski,” Central European Financial 
Observer.eu, June 3, 2017, https://financialobserver.eu/baltics/alexela-group-to-continue-lng-import-
terminal-in-paldiski/. 
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supply security. Otherwise, if Russia blockaded Finland only, the Baltic states would re-
export gas to Finland. This analysis assumes that only Finland is blockaded and estimates 
the cost for Finland to import Russian gas that has been stored in Latvia and re-exported 
to Finland. Transit fees for Incukalns to Helsinki are estimated as well as injection and 
withdrawal costs. This model estimates the cost for Finland to deny Russia the ability to 
blockade Finland alone.  
 
Pipeline	  CAPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M)	  
	   Onshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2274/km-­‐mm)	   119.39	  
	   Onshore	  Middle	  Estimate	  (US$1229/km-­‐mm)	   64.52	  
	   Onshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$933/km-­‐mm)	   48.98	  
	   Offshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2622/km-­‐mm)	   141.33	  
	   Offshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$1305/km-­‐mm)	   70.34	  
	   	   	  
Pipeline	  OPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	  
	   Transit	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   21.13	  
	   Withdrawal/Injection	  Cost	  ($365/Mcm)	   0.91	  
	   Total	   30.79	  
	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  (US$M)	   290.25	  
	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	   High	   0.55	  
	   Low	   0.41	  
Table 18: Balticonnector Estimated Cost 
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5.2.4 Finland Denmark Offshore 
A fourth infrastructure project would connect Finland to the Danish Supply hub 
via the Baltic Sea. This would give Finland access to the supplies from western Europe 
and the Nord Stream. Offshore pipeline projects are generally more expensive than 
onshore pipeline, and thus are built with a large capacity in order to achieve economies of 
scale. The Nord Stream pipeline, for example, has a capacity of 55 bcm/yr. With only a 
2.5 bcm demand in 2015, it would make little sense to build a pipeline with this limited 
capacity at the cost requirement of offshore pipelines. Therefore, the capacity of this 
Finland-Denmark pipeline is estimated at 4.5 bcm/yr allowing Finland the potential to 
supply future natural gas consumption growth, and also to supply the Baltic region from 
the North if interconnection is built. This estimates the cost for Finland to directly 
connect to the EU grid in order to substitute Russian supply. The pipeline length was 
estimated using the route of the Nord Stream as a guide. 
 
Finland-­‐Denmark	  Offshore	  
	  consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
pipeline	  length,	  offshore	  (km)	   1150	  
 
Table 19: Finland-Denmark Offshore Dimensions 
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Figure 9: Finland-Denmark Offshore Proposed Route130 
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Pipeline	  CAPEX	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	  	   Offshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2622/km-­‐mm)	   2.11	  
	  	   Offshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$1305/km-­‐mm)	   1.05	  
	   	   	  
Pipeline	  OPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	  
	   Transit	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   62.96	  
	   Total	   71.71	  
	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  (US$M)	   676.00	  
	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	  	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	  	   High	  	   2.79	  
	  	   Low	   1.73	  
 
Table 20: Finland-Denmark Offshore Estimated Cost 	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5.4 PROJECT COMPARISON 	  Estimated	  Cost	  over	  30	  Year	  Life	   High	  ($M)	   Low	  ($M)	  	   	   	  Helsinki-­‐Hammerfest	  Pipeline	   2.53	   1.14	  Inkoo	  LNG	  2.5	   5.57	   4.25	  Balticonnector	   0.55	   0.41	  Finland-­‐Denmark	  Offshore	   2.79	   1.73	  	  
Table 21: Finland Project Cost Comparison 
The table above shows the estimated cost for Finland to substitute Russian supply 
on a 30-year timescale.  
The highest cost project was the Inkoo LNG 2.5 at US$4.25-5.57 B. This project 
represents the cost if Finland were to construct LNG import capability and replace all 
Russia supply (2.5 bcm/yr) with LNG. The high LNG surcharge makes it an expensive 
option to cover all of Finland’s natural gas demand. The Inkoo LNG option relies on 
slack capacity within a mature globalized LNG market. 
The Helsinki-Hammerfest or the Finland-Denmark Offshore pipeline would be 
the more prudent choice at roughly half the price of the Inkoo LNG facility, US$1.14-
2.53 B and US$1.72-2.78 B, respectively. But, the Helsinki-Hammerfest pipeline offers 
less supply security because it relies on the estimated life of one field. The Finland-
Denmark pipeline requires access to the exclusive economic zones of a number of EU 
states and a continued supply of natural gas from western Europe. This option gives 
Finland access to the EU internal gas market which includes the slack LNG capacity of 
western Europe, gas production of Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK, and gas 
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originating from the Nord Stream. The offshore connection to the Denmark hub would 
force Russia to blockade much of Europe in order to target Finland, at substantial cost. 
The lowest cost option at US$0.41-0.55 B, the Balticonnector, is attractive in 
terms of price and offers Finland access to Latvian storage and Lithuanian LNG. Given 
current infrastructure, the project would force Russia to blockade the entire Baltic grid if 
it were to attempt to coerce Finland. Otherwise, the Baltic states could re-export Russian 
gas to Finland. In the event of a complete shutdown of Russian supply to the Baltics and 
Finland, Finland would be left last in line after the other Baltic states, as replacement gas 
originates from either Lithuanian LNG imports or stored gas in Latvia. The 
Balticonnector CAPEX has been estimated to cost  US$298 M by the EU Commission 
and the CAPEX high estimate in this analysis is US$260 M.131   
If built today, the BEMIP plan would connect Finland to the Baltic transmission 
system but not yet to the EU internal gas market because the Gas Interconnection Poland-
Lithuania (GIPL) project is not scheduled for completion until 2021. 132 The total import 
capacity of the Klaipeda facility is 4 bcm/yr and the total gas demand for the Baltic states 
in 2016 was 5.4 bcm. Therefore only 1.1 bcm of Finland’s 2.5 bcm consumption could  
be covered if Russia were to cut off all supplies to the combined Baltic-Finland gas 
network and the Baltic states’ consumption were to remain normal.  
The GIPL, once completed, is expected to add 3.4 bcm/yr of capacity to the Baltic 
grid, but depends on slack supply from the EU internal market. The GIPL/BEMIP option 
is less attractive in terms of energy security than the Finland-Denmark Offshore though 
both access the EU internal market. The Finland-Denmark Offshore links Finland directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 European Commission, “Balticonnector – gas pipeline: Questions and Answers,” European Commission 
Factsheet, October 21, 2016,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3476_en.htm. 
132 “Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania,” Hydrocarbons Technology, https://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/gas-interconnection-polandlithuania/. 
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to a major European supply hub, where the GIPL/BEMIP plan requires gas be transited 
through a number of states prior to reaching Finland. In a crisis situation, each transit 
state  will satisfy their own demand and storage requirements ahead of Finland, making 
the offshore option more attractive due to the lack of transit states. The GIPL is estimated 
to cost US$600 M, so if combined with the Balticonnector estimated in this analysis 
would come to roughly US$1 B.133 
In conclusion, all of the options presented have trade-offs in terms of providing 
Finland with natural gas security.  The Finland-Denmark Offshore pipeline would force 
Russia, at high cost, to blockade much of Europe to target Finland. The Balticonnector is 
the lowest cost option and would require Russia to blockade the Baltics and Finland in 
order to attempt to coerce Finland. If the Balticonnector was combined with the GIPL, 
Finland would be connected to the EU internal market but at the mercy of a number of 
transit states. The Helsinki-Hammerfest pipeline shifts dependence to a single field rather 
than the entire EU internal market. The Inkoo LNG scenario is prohibitively expensive as 
an option to fully replace Russia supply due to the high LNG surcharge.  
The combined BEMIP/GIPL projects and the Finland-Denmark offshore pipelines 
offer the security of the connection EU internal market. The BEMIP/GIPL plan offers a 
lower security of supply due to the number of transit states involved, but at more than 
half the price of the offshore pipeline. 	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 “Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania,” Hydrocarbons Technology. 
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Chapter 6: Case Study–Bulgaria 
6.1 BACKGROUND/BULGARIA’S ENERGY MIX 
Bulgaria is supplied with natural gas solely from Russia, with all of its imports 
arriving via pipeline transit across Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania. In recent years, 
Bulgaria has acted as a transit state for Russian exports to Greece, Macedonia, and 
Turkey. Domestic natural gas production was 0.1 bcm in 2016, and imports totaled 2.6 
bcm.134  Natural gas makes up 14% of Bulgaria’s total energy consumption.135  Half of the 
country’s natural gas consumption comes from industry and about a third of its 
consumption is used for heat.136 In the event of a natural gas disruption, industrial 
production and the provision of heat services will be affected, as exemplified by the 2009 
disruption of natural gas imports. 
The January 2009 disruption of natural gas originating in Russia and transported 
via Ukraine exposed Bulgaria’s lack of preparedness for an event of this type. When 
Russian imports were shut down January 6th, Bulgarian natural gas consumption dropped 
from 13 Mcm/day to Mcm/day. Much of this consumption came from Bulgaria’s Chiren 
UGS facility, which had a maximum withdrawal rate of 4.3 Mcm/day.137 An expansion of 
the facility or the addition of another UGS facility are potential strategies to reduce the 
country’s vulnerability to natural gas disruption in the short-term, but neither could 
replace imports from Russia in the long-term. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 EU Commission Country Datasheets, February 2018. 
135 “Country Factsheet Bulgaria,” European Commission, November 18, 2015, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015SC0217. 
136 Silve and Noel, “Cost Curves for Gas Supply Security: The Case of Bulgaria.” 
137 Ibid. 
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Figure 10: Ukraine to Bulgaria Transit Route (TransBalkan pipeline)138 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 ENTSOG 2017. 
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Figure 11: Bulgarian Annual Natural Gas Consumption (bcm/yr)139  	  
Bulgaria does not have any domestic LNG import capacity, and its access to the 
global LNG market is limited by geography. Turkey does not currently allow LNG 
tankers to travel through the Bosporus Strait to access the Black Sea. Greece and Turkey 
have LNG import facilities that could be accessed, but current interconnection between 
Turkey and Bulgaria does not flow in the direction of Bulgaria, and the interconnection 
from Greece to Bulgaria only has reverse flow sufficient to provide 1 Mcm/day or 0.365 
bcm/yr. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 EU Commission Country Datasheets, February 2018. 
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Figure 12: Bulgaria-Greece-Turkey Natural Gas Transmission140 	  
Bulgaria could access the global LNG market by an interconnection with Greece, 
which has excess LNG import capacity. Greece’s current import capacity at its 
Revithoussa LNG facility (blue circle Figure 10) is 5.2 bcm/yr, and the country imported 
2.9 bcm from Russia in 2017, which was supplied by pipeline via Bulgaria. So if supply 
to Bulgaria from Russia, and therefore to Greece from Bulgaria, were stopped, the 
potential supply of natural gas to Bulgaria from Greek LNG by reversing pipeline flow 
would be 2.3 bcm/yr, or 6.3 Mcm/day. If combined with the potential 4.3 Mcm/day 
outflow from Bulgaria’s Chiren gas storage facility, this reverse flow of LNG would still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 ENTSOG 2017. 
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leave a crisis consumption shortfall of roughly 2.7 Mcm/day in Bulgaria – and a much 
greater shortfall once the Chiren facility’s stores were used up. Moreover, the 
interconnection from Bulgaria to Greece currently has only limited capability to flow 
north (1 Mcm/day), though the pipeline was made available in 2009 to supply Bulgaria 
via the linepack method, but Bulgaria opted not to use that potential supply.  
In November 2016, the Interconnector Bulgaria-Romania (IBR) pipeline 
completed construction with a maximum capacity of 1.5 bcm/yr of 4.11 Mcm/day.141 The 
IBR pipeline allows Bulgarian access to Romanian domestic supplies and natural gas 
storage in the event of a disruption. This makes targeting Bulgaria for coercion more 
difficult, in that in a disruption, Romania could import Russian natural gas and supply 
Bulgaria by the IBR. Therefore, Russia would have to stop supplies to both Romania and 
Bulgaria in order to target Bulgaria. Additionally, if Russia were to target Bulgaria, it 
would also have to cut off supply to Greece, who is downstream, but has the option to 
import LNG. So the construction of the IGB offers Bulgaria an added level of supply 
security, in that if Russia were to target Bulgaria, it would also have to target Romania 
and Greece, both of who have additional sources of supply. 
A “Project of Common Interest” (PCI) of the EU Commission is the 
Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB).  This pipeline connects Bulgarian demand to the 
northern Greek network and the proposed Alexandroupolis LNG facility in the northeast 
of Greece. This project allows Bulgaria access to Greek LNG and also to natural gas 
coming from Turkey. Bulgaria also has contracted Azerbaijan for 1 bcm/yr starting in 
2020 for natural gas coming from Shah Deniz 2, though the ability to import from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Reuters Staff, “Bulgaria and Romania launch gas pipeline,” Reuters, November 11, 2016, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/bulgaria-gas-romania/bulgaria-and-romania-launch-gas-pipeline-
idUSL8N1DB2YX. 
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Azerbaijan from a route other than Russia does not currently exist.142 This is part of the 
larger EU project of the Southern Gas Corridor, which is an estimated US$41.5 B 
project.143  
 
 
 
Figure 13:  Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB)144 
A number of large-scale pipelines have been proposed to supply Bulgaria with gas 
originating in Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, and numerous other 
countries. These include the Southern Gas Corridor, NABUCCO, the Trans Anatolian 
pipeline (TANAP), the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the Eastring, the South Stream, 
among others. The chaotic and unfinished negotiations for so many potential projects 
may be a reason for the lack of required Bulgarian import and transmission infrastructure: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Trend News Agency, “Bulgaria could become a hub for Azerbaijani gas supply–envoy,” Azernews, 
January 29, 2018, https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/126227.html. 
143 Ibid. 
144 ENTSOG 2017. 
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the country has constantly been in negotiation for large-scale projects to supply the 
greater region. Russia’s South Stream project, which had begun construction on the 
Russian end, would have supplied Bulgaria by offshore pipeline through the Black Sea, 
but it was blocked by the EU in the wake of the Crimean annexation. Though many plans 
exist to supply Bulgaria by large-scale multi-state pipelines, few have come to fruition. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Proposed South Stream Route145 
There have been plans for a “White Stream” pipeline that would supply Romania 
with Azerbaijani natural gas transmitted through Georgia and the Black Sea. For 
purposes of comparison, this analysis estimates an offshore pipeline project of this type 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 “Romania Tells Russia It Wants to Be Part of South Stream,” Sofia News Agency, February 18, 2010, 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/113293/Romania+Tells+Russia+It+Wants+to+Be+Part+of+South+Strea
m. 
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that would supply Bulgaria. This could provide Bulgaria with more gas security than the 
TANAP plan would, as Bulgaria’s gas would not have to transit via Turkey, which would 
presumably supply itself before Bulgaria in a crisis. The same could be said about 
Georgia, but natural gas originating in Azerbaijan, given current infrastructure, must 
travel through Georgia to reach Bulgaria via either route.  
 
 
 
Figure 15: Proposed Routes to Access Azerbaijani Supply146 
6.2 STRATEGIES TO REDUCE NATURAL GAS COERCIVE VULNERABILITY 	  
Four infrastructure plans are modeled and compared to determine the best 
available option to replace Russian natural gas services. None of these options represents 
direct control of resources, as each depends on cooperation with second-party states.  
Some projects must be completed together to supply Bulgaria. For example, the 
Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria allows Bulgaria access to the proposed Alexandroupolis 
LNG facility. This second Greek LNG facility does not make sense to build unless the 
IGB is completed, because Greece can already fulfill its domestic demand with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 “The Project–White Stream,” White Stream, 2018, http://www.white-stream.com/the-project/. 
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existing LNG facility at Revithoussa if supply from Russia were cut off. These projects 
include the Interconnector Bulgaria–Serbia, which connects Bulgaria to the larger EU 
internal market, a Black Sea offshore pipeline to bring supply from Azerbaijan, the 
Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria which would allow Bulgaria to import from Greece and 
Turkey (including access to Greek LNG and the proposed TANAP), and the construction 
of further LNG capacity in Greece in concert with the construction of the IGB. 
6.2.1 Interconnector Bulgaria–Serbia (IBS) 
The Interconnector Bulgaria–Serbia (IBG) connects Bulgaria to supplies of 
natural gas originating from the EU internal market. This pipeline runs from Sofia to Nis, 
Serbia. More specifically, this pipeline would connect Bulgaria to Hungary, which has 
positioned itself as a hub due to its substantial storage and ability to receive natural gas 
from the east or west. This pipeline was originally planned to begin construction in 2013 
and begin functioning in 2015.147 Serbia’s agreement to the pipeline was considered a 
concession to the EU, due to Serbia’s participation in the South Stream project, which 
was viewed as non-compliant with the EU Third Energy Package.148 The South Stream 
was scrapped by Russia in late 2014, citing non-cooperation from the EU.149 The South 
Stream would have connected Russia to Bulgaria by offshore pipeline in the Black Sea. 
Both Bulgaria and Serbia were set to earn substantial revenue from the project, and both 
had delayed construction of the IBS, in hopes of approval of the larger project. A new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 “Gas Interconnection Bulgaria-Serbia Pipeline,” Hydrocarbons Technology, accessed March  
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148 “Bulgaria–Serbia Interconnector–the latest development,” BDK: Advokati, accessed March 29, 2018, 
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149 Georgi Gotev, “Russia confirms decision to abandon South Stream,” Euractiv, December 10, 2014, 
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agreement was signed between Bulgaria and Serbia in early 2017 for the construction of 
the interconnection, which is ongoing.  
 
 	  
Figure 16: Proposed Interconnection  Bulgaria-Serbia (Nis-Sofia)150 
Capital cost for this project is estimated, and then modeled for operating expenses 
as if Bulgaria were accessing supply from Hungarian natural gas storage facilities, 
reflecting the added cost for injection/withdrawal and transit. This distance is estimated at 
579 km which is the distance from Bulgaria’s capital Sofia to Subotica, where there is 
IGS at the Hungarian border. Three storage facilities exist near the Hungary-Serbian 
border (white diamonds) and are considered the target or access for Bulgaria.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150  ENTSOG 2017. 
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Figure 17: Proposed Route Hungary to Bulgaria151 
 
Interconnector	  Bulgaria-­‐Serbia	  
	  consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
pipeline	  length	  Sofia	  to	  Nis(km)	   150	  
Sofia	  to	  Subotica	  (km)	   579	  
Table 22: Interconnector Bulgaria-Serbia Dimensions 
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Pipeline	  CAPEX	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	   Onshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2274/km-­‐mm)	   0.24	  
	   Onshore	  Middle	  Estimate	  (US$1229/km-­‐mm)	   0.13	  
	   Onshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$933/km-­‐mm)	   0.10	  
	   	   	  Pipeline	  OPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	  
	   Transit	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   32.85	  
	   Withdrawal/Injection	  Cost	  ($365/Mcm)	   0.91	  
	   Total	   42.51	  
	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  (US$M)	   400.76	  
	   	   	  Total	  Cost	  	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	  	   High	  	   0.64	  
	  	   Middle	   0.53	  
	  	   Low	   0.50	  
Table 23: Interconnector Bulgaria-Serbia Estimated Cost 
 
6.2.2 Black Sea Offshore (Georgia-Bulgaria) 
European markets have long attempted to access Azerbaijani natural gas supply 
via a route other than through Russia. Currently, the Trans Anatolian pipeline (TANAP), 
which traverses Turkey, and the White Stream offshore project connecting Georgia to 
Romania are a few of many proposed projects. The proposed route through Romania 
allows for connection not only to Romanian transmission and storage, but also eventual 
connection to the Hungary hub and Ukrainian demand. An offshore pipeline connecting 
Georgia to Bulgaria is modeled as a more direct route for Bulgaria to increase its natural 
gas security.  The current estimation, for simplicity, is to supply Bulgarian demand, but 
an offshore pipeline likely would be constructed at higher capacity in order to supply 
consumers farther downstream than Bulgaria. This offshore pipeline likely would be in 
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competition with the TANAP for connection to future TAP pipeline that would supply 
Greece, Albania, and Italy. 	  
Black	  Sea	  Pipeline	  Georgia-­‐Bulgaria	   Column1	  
consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
offshore	  pipeline	  length	  (km)	   1172	  
Table 24: Black Sea Pipeline Georgia-Bulgaria 
 	  
Pipeline	  CAPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M)	  
	  	   Offshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2622/km-­‐mm)	   2.11	  
	  	   Offshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$1305/km-­‐mm)	   1.05	  
	   	   	  
Pipeline	  OPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	  
	   Transit	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   62.96	  
	   Total	   71.71	  
	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  (US$M)	   676.00	  
	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	  	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	  	   High	  	   2.79	  
	  	   Low	   1.73	  
Table 25: Black Sea Pipeline Georgia-Bulgaria 
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6.2.3 Interconnection Greece-Bulgaria (IGB)  
The Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (Figure 17) aims to allow Bulgaria access to 
imports from Greece and Turkey. This pipeline may also be used to connect Bulgaria to 
supply from TANAP, if completed, and to access the proposed Greek Alexandroupolis 
LNG facility. Neither Greece nor Turkey has gas production that could be exported to 
Bulgaria. Imports from either country would originate from another producer. Both 
countries have slack LNG capacity, Greece at Revithoussa, and Turkey at Allaga. The 
current Kipi interconnection pipeline has a capacity of 0.750 bcm/yr flowing from 
Turkey to Greece. If combined with current Greek Revithoussa reverse flow capacity 
(0.365 bcm/yr) and the 1.5 bcm/yr maximum technical capacity for the Interconnector 
Romania and Bulgaria (IRB) these could cover Bulgaria’s 2.5 bcm/yr demand, but would 
be stretched thin in the winter months. This strategy assumes slack supplies in Romania, 
Turkey, and Greece, but in order for Russia to blockade Bulgaria, it would have to reduce 
supplies to all three of these countries so this slack supply may be difficult to access in a 
crisis. This model assumes 1.0 bcm/yr supply comes from Greek and Turkish LNG and 
supplies from Romania (1.5 bcm/yr) pay the injection/withdrawal fee for access to 
Romanian UGS.  Transit fees are applied to all three and the distances traveled are listed 
below. The IGB CAPEX is also used in order to model the cost of its combination with 
the Alexandroupolis LNG facility.  
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Figure 18: Proposed Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria Route152	  
 
 
Interconnector	  Greece-­‐Bulgaria	  
	  consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
pipeline	  length	  (km)	   182	  
pipeline	  portion	  in	  Greece	  (km)	   31	  
pipeline	  portion	  in	  Bulgaria	  (km)	   151	  
Romania	  UGS	  to	  Bulgaria	  (km)	   63	  
Revithoussa,	  Greece	  to	  Petrich,	  Bulgaria	   628	  
Allaga	  LNG,	  Turkey	  to	  IGB	   618	  
Table 26: Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria Dimensions 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 ENTSOG 2017. 
 90 
Pipeline	  CAPEX	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	   Onshore	  High	  Estimate	  (US$2274/km-­‐mm)	   0.29	  
	   Onshore	  Middle	  Estimate	  (US$1229/km-­‐mm)	   0.16	  
	   Onshore	  Low	  Estimate	  (US$933/km-­‐mm)	   0.12	  
	   	   	  
Pipeline	  OPEX	   	   Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	  
	   Transit	  Rom-­‐Bulg	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   2.07	  
	   Transit	  Gree-­‐Bulg	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   5.02	  
	   Transit	  Turk-­‐Bulg	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   10.15	  
	   Withdrawal/Injection	  Cost	  ($365/Mcm)	   0.55	  
	   LNG	  Surcharge	  High	  ($216M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   216.00	  
	   Total	   242.54	  
	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  (US$B)	   2.29	  
	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	  	   	   Cost	  ($B)	  
	  	   High	  	   2.58	  
	  	   Middle	   2.45	  
	  	   Low	   2.41	  
Table 27: Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria Estimated Cost 
6.2.4 Alexandroupolis LNG 
The Greek Alexandroupolis LNG facility would give Bulgaria closer access to 
LNG than the IGB alone. Bulgaria and Greece have discussed the construction of 
additional LNG capacity in Greece. The agreement has changed various times and a 
decision as to how to proceed is expected at some point in 2018. The project requires 
additional pipeline infrastructure to connect the island facility to the IBG, including 17 
km of offshore pipeline and 28 km of onshore pipeline.153 Supplying Bulgaria by 
Alexandroupolis LNG is contingent upon the completion of the IBG, but it will give 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 “GasLog to participate in Alexandroupolis LNG project,” gastrade, accessed March 29, 2018, 
http://www.gastrade.gr/en/the-company/news-press-releases/gaslog-to-participate-in-the-alexandroupolis-
lng-project.aspx. 
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Bulgaria more direct access to LNG, lessening the concern regarding Greece or Turkey 
fulfilling its demand requirements prior to Bulgaria. This project is assumed to be 
constructed in concert with the IBG and be modeled to provide 2.5bcm/yr to Bulgaria.  
 
 
Figure 19: Alexandroupolis LNG 
 
Alexandroupolis	  LNG	   Column1	  
consumption	  (bcm/yr)	   2.5	  
FSRU	  import	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4	  
1-­‐	  FSRU	  170	  kcm	  storage	   1	  
pipeline	  capacity	  (bcm/yr)	   4.5	  
pipeline	  diameter	  (mm)	   700	  
onshore	  pipeline	  length	  (km)	   28	  
offshore	  pipeline	  length	  (km)	   17	  
Alexandroupolis	  to	  Bulgaria	  (km)	   76	  
Table 28: Alexandroupolis LNG Dimensions 
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The price estimate below assumes that all Bulgarian demand is obtained through 
Alexandroupolis LNG and the IBG interconnector exists so the capital costs for the IBG 
are added. The transit fee includes the distance from Alexandroupolis to the IGB and then 
to Bulgaria, totaling 76km. 
 
 
LNG	  CAPEX	   	  
High	  Cost	  
($M)	  
Low	  Cost	  
($M)	  
	   1-­‐	  FSRU	  170	  kcm	  storage	   280.00	   236.00	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1-­‐Online	  Infrastructure	   30.00	   30.00	  
	   1-­‐Constructionof	  Jetty/Pipeline	   80.00	   80.00	  
	   Total	  LNG	  CAPEX	  	   390.00	   346.00	  
	   	   	   	  
Pipeline	  
CAPEX	   	  
High	  Cost	  
($M)	  
Low	  Cost	  
($M)	  
	   Interconnector	  Greece-­‐Bulgaria	   290.00	   120.00	  
	   Onshore	  Alexandroupolis	   44.57	   18.29	  
	   Offshore	  Alexandroupolis	   32.10	   15.53	  
	   Total	  Pipeline	  CAPEX	   366.67	   153.82	  
	   	   	   	  
LNG	  OPEX	   2.5	  bcm/yr	   High	  Cost	  ($M/yr)	  
Low	  Cost	  
($M/yr)	  
	   LNG	  Operations	  &	  Maintenance	   9.75	   8.65	  
	   LNG	  Surcharge	  (2.5bcm/yr)	   540.00	   405.00	  
	   Transit	  fee	  (US$2.19/kcm-­‐100km)	   4.16	   4.16	  
	   Compression	  (US$3.5M	  per	  bcm/yr)	   8.75	   8.75	  
	   Total	  (2.5bcm/yr)	   562.66	   426.56	  
	   	   	   	  
	   PV	  of	  OPEX,	  30	  yr,	  10%	  discount	  rate	  ($B)	   5.30	   4.02	  
	   	   	   	  
Total	  Cost	   	   High	  Cost	  ($B)	  
Low	  Cost	  
($B)	  
	   	   6.06	   4.52	  
Table 29: Alexandroupolis LNG Estimated Cost 
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6.3 PROJECT COMPARISON 
 
Estimated	  Cost	  over	  30	  Year	  Life	   High	  ($B)	   Low	  ($B)	  
Interconnection	  Bulgaria-­‐Serbia	   0.64	   0.5	  
Black	  Sea	  Pipeline	  Georgia-­‐Bulgaria	   2.79	   1.73	  
Interconnection	  Greece-­‐Bulgaria	   2.58	   2.49	  
Alexandroupolis	  LNG	  with	  IGB	   6.06	   4.52	  
	   	   	  
Table 30: Bulgaria Project Cost Comparison 
Bulgaria’s choices to provide natural gas security are all imperfect, in that they all 
rely on the reliability of supply countries and at least one transit country. The IBS 
pipeline connects Bulgaria to the EU transmission grid, but a number of countries will be 
competing for supply in time of crisis, and so the reliability of this route is difficult to 
gauge. Additionally, the gas supplied to Hungary and Serbia generally originates in 
Russia. Bulgaria could contract Hungary to hold some storage capacity for Bulgaria, but 
this would include a cost to Bulgaria and lower the ability for Hungary to respond to its 
own crisis. The Black Sea offshore pipeline offers more direct access to gas supplies, but 
it is costly and would be subject to EU approval of a non-EU member pipeline and 
depends upon the reliability of Azerbaijan as a supplier and Georgia as a transit state. A 
larger capacity pipeline would be advisable allowing Bulgaria to act as a regional hub and 
earn transit fees, but is outside of the scope of this thesis. The IGB pipeline gives 
Bulgaria access to 0.750 bcm/yr capacity from Turkey in addition to the 0.365 bcm/yr 
reverse flow capacity from Revithoussa. These sources, if combined with Romanian 
supply from IBR, could more than cover Bulgaria’s yearly supply, but they would be 
stretched thin in a winter disruption, when demand is highest. The combined 
Alexandroupolis LNG and IGB would give Bulgaria access to enough natural gas to 
fulfill demand requirements, but at a high per unit cost due to the LNG surcharge.  
 94 
 Overall, the low price of the IBG makes it an attractive option and integration into 
the EU internal market offers collective supply security.  Bulgaria would be left to rely on 
Hungary and Serbia fulfilling domestic needs prior to Bulgaria, but due to increased 
reverse flow capacity in Hungary, access to supply is reasonably assured. The IRB 
pipeline has given Bulgaria access to Romanian production and storage, giving Bulgaria 
an additional option if supplies from Hungary are lacking. Interconnection to the EU 
internal market appears to be the best option given Bulgaria given the construction of the 
IRB. 	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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 CONCLUSION 	  
Russia’s potential  use of a gas weapon against EU states has for a long time made 
for provocative headlines. In response, a number of equally headline-catching high-priced 
pipeline projects have been proposed to diffuse this weapon by accessing natural gas 
supplied from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Israel, and Qatar, among others. The United 
States’ recent transition from importer of natural gas to LNG exporter, and the growth of 
the global LNG market, has also caused many to speculate whether LNG could be the 
solution to the gas weapon. Smaller scale pipelines that interconnect to the EU internal 
market have proved to be cost effective though reliant on a cooperative strategy by the 
EU. This study has provided a  framework to compare the options available to EU 
countries in order to reduce coercive vulnerability to Russia through construction of 
infrastructure to substitute supply. 	   The	  natural	  gas	  security	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  member	  states	  is	  constantly	  evolving	  and	  	  the	  pricing	  framework	  provided	  in	  this	  thesis	  allows	  the	  states	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  evaluate	  options	  to	  reduce	  coercive	  vulnerability	  as	  conditions	  change.	  Currently,	  the	  Power	  of	  Siberia	  pipeline	  is	  under	  construction	  and	  will	  supply	  China	  with	  38	  bcm	  of	  Russian	  gas	  per	  year	  starting	  in	  2019.154	  This	  project	  will	  give	  Russia	  another	  large	  scale	  customer,	  reducing	  Russia’s	  dependence	  on	  the	  EU,	  and	  potentially	  weakening	  the	  mutual	  dependence	  that	  allows	  the	  reverse	  flow	  strategy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 “Gazprom Export-China,” accessed April 29, 2018, 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/china/http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/china/. 
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to	  function.	  But,	  Russia	  and	  the	  EU	  are	  in	  discussions	  for	  a	  second	  Nord	  Stream	  pipeline	  that	  would	  add	  55	  bcm/yr	  of	  capacity,	  or	  double	  the	  current	  capacity,	  and	  furthering	  mutual	  dependence.	  Gas	  production	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  is	  in	  decline	  likely	  leading	  to	  increased	  western	  European	  dependence	  on	  imports.	  Norway	  and	  Algeria	  continue	  to	  be	  important	  trade	  partners	  but	  their	  future	  production	  is	  uncertain	  as	  well.	  Azerbaijani	  gas	  is	  scheduled	  to	  begin	  deliveries	  to	  southeastern	  Europe	  in	  2020,	  but	  depends	  on	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  Trans	  Anatolian	  pipeline.	  The	  global	  LNG	  market	  is	  set	  to	  grow	  50%	  by	  2020,	  giving	  the	  EU	  additional	  sources	  of	  supply.	  All	  of	  these	  developments	  are	  occurring	  within	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  policies	  aimed	  at	  lowering	  carbon	  emissions,	  which	  could	  lead	  to	  increased	  natural	  gas	  consumption	  as	  states	  move	  away	  from	  coal	  or	  decreased	  natural	  gas	  consumption	  if	  a	  movement	  toward	  renewables	  or	  nuclear	  energy	  occurs.	  	  The	  state	  of	  EU	  natural	  gas	  security	  is	  fluid	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  compare	  options	  is	  necessary	  for	  state	  decision	  makers.	  	  
Many EU countries, such as the Baltics and the Visegrad Group, acted in response 
to the potential for future disruptions of supply from Russia by the construction of 
infrastructure to obtain substitute supply. Within Rosemary Kelanic’s framework, these 
countries aimed to lower their coercive vulnerability by taking anticipatory strategies. 
The threat of an eventual supply disruption and the costs associated with such a 
disruption were high enough that these countries were willing to pay for substitute supply 
options.  These strategies including reversing flow of existing pipelines, building LNG 
import capacity, and interconnecting state transmission grids.  
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The responses of EU countries to the 2006 and 2009 supply disruptions were 
examined to produce a pricing framework to evaluate options to substitute for Russian 
supply. When applied to Finland and Bulgaria, the pricing framework produced mixed 
results because substitution strategies are subject to the geography, the location of 
resources, and the existence of infrastructure.  
For Finland, interconnection to the Baltic grid was the lowest price option, and 
would force Russia to blockade all of the Baltic states in order to target Finland. The 
Finland-Denmark offshore pipeline provides access to the EU internal market and the 
additional security of Russia having to disrupt the Nord Stream, at high cost, to target 
Finland.  The combination of the Balticonnector and the GIPL project provides a 
connection to the EU internal market at lower cost than the Finland-Denmark offshore 
pipeline but at lower security of supply due to the number of transit states required. LNG 
appeared to be prohibitively costly as a substitute for Russian natural gas due to the high 
cost of liquefaction, transport, and regasification.  
Bulgaria’s import substitution strategy differed from Finland, but interconnection 
to the EU internal market also appears to be the best option. The construction of the IRB 
pipeline has given Bulgaria access to Romanian domestic gas supply and storage. The 
remaining Bulgarian demand could be supplied by an interconnection to Serbia, allowing 
Bulgaria to access the Hungarian hub connected to the EU internal market and Russian 
supply. The construction of the IGB pipeline would give Bulgaria access to Greek and 
Turkish supplies, which would come from slack LNG import capacity because neither 
country has significant gas production. The construction of the IGB in concert with the 
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Alexandroupolis LNG or the TANAP would give Bulgaria addition access to supplies, 
but at high cost if LNG is replacing Russian supply. The interconnection to Serbia gives 
Bulgaria access to the EU internal market, and the supply security it provides, at low cost. 
Interconnection to Greek LNG or the TANAP appear to be costly options contingent 
upon the decisions of other countries and the successful completion of projects which is 
difficult to predict.   
This study offers a pricing framework for the states of Eastern Europe to make 
strategic investments in order maintain secure supply of natural gas and reduce state 
vulnerability to the cost of coercion in a constantly changing gas market. The framework 
has been applied to Bulgaria and Finland to test the available options for these countries. 
Interconnection to the neighboring transmission systems and the EU internal market 
offered the lowest cost option but depends on slack capacity in the EU grid, the normal 
functioning of the Nord Stream, and transit state reliability. LNG import facilities provide 
access to the global LNG market but at higher per unit price than pipeline imports. The 
costs and benefits of each infrastructure project to reduce dependence must be weighed 
against the potential costs of coercion. When the potential cost of coercion is higher than 
the cost of a strategy to reduce coercive vulnerability, a state will logically take action to 
ensure its energy security 
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